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Introduction

* ‘Leurs goûts ont décidé son sort.’

The above sentence is an attempt at translation by an Anglophone, for the English
Their taste decided his fate. It is flawed because the translator has omitted the word de after
the verb ont décidé. De is a preposition that must be inserted automatically between the
verb décider and a following object in French. The translator was ignorant of this fact and
made a mistake. How could (s)he have known that a preposition was needed in French,
when none is used in the English equivalent of this sentence ? The current way of dealing
with this issue is for a non-native speaker of French, to memorise the correct verbal
construction, including the preposition de, in the lexical entry for the verb décider.
The issue at stake in this example is transitivity. In the English sentence Their taste decided
his fate, it is said that the verb to decide is directly transitive since it does not involve any
preposition; however, the French equivalent Leurs goûts ont décidé de son sort introduces the
preposition de between the verb and its object: it is said that décider is an indirect transitive
verb. Transitivity is a phenomenon widely attested across languages. It is generally
accepted that it has universal properties. Regardless of the languages concerned, certain
types of verbs seem destined to behave transitively and others intransitively.
Intransitive verbs have no objects at all. Givón (1990) gives a classification of verbs, of
which certain categories, according to him, are universally intransitive. They include
subjectless verbs „[which] most commonly denote natural or atmospheric phenomena‟
(Givón, p.89): examples are It is raining/Il pleut, in which both it and il are impersonal
subject pronouns. Copular sentences of the type He is a teacher or She is tall, where the
predicate is a noun or an adjective, not a verb, are often used in a habitual sense for
descriptions. Objectless verbs describe states, as opposed to events or processes: Givón
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gives the examples My child is sick or The woman is sad for the Bemba language. And finally,
he cites verbs requiring a sentential subject, of the type be true, be likely, be good, be difficult,
etc. because they also use an adjective as their predicate; Givón states that they are either
epistemic or evaluative in nature, or that they assess „ease-of-performance‟. Each of these
categories then appears to be semantically motivated, and semantic motifs can be traced
across languages. The assumption is that the same semantic values in all languages (give
or take a few exceptions) will translate into syntactic structures of varying forms maybe,
but of identical transitivity. Any of the above categories mentioned by Givón should
yield a syntactic structure of intransitive form. On the other hand, a sentence involving at
least two interacting participants fulfils the basic requirements for transitivity, and such a
combination should yield syntactic structures of a transitive nature in any language.
However, let us come back to our starting point. The sentence Their taste decided his
fate/Leurs goûts ont décidé de son sort always presented us with two participants, in French or
in English. In any language, a process is taking place between their taste and his fate (or
between leurs goûts and son sort), whereby the object is affected by the subject. The
difference between the two languages does not therefore reside in the issue of transitivity
per se, but in the determination of its directness or indirectness. Why does French
require an object to be made indirect by introduction of a preposition after the verb
décider, while English favours a direct relation between the equivalent verb to decide and its
following object ?

In our first chapter, we will provide definitions for the common types of transitivity
patterns to be found in both English and French. In the second and third chapters, we
will give an overview of current research into the issue of transitivity. In chapters 4 and 5,
we will attempt to find an explanation for the difference in transitivity displayed by a
number of verbs in English and in French. Our primary purpose here is to investigate
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the concept of transitivity with a view to establishing what distinguishes its directness
from its indirectness. In so doing, we should be able to find out whether those are issues
of universal scope, or whether they are language-specific. We will draw conclusions in
our chapter 6.

Throughout this work, we have used numerous examples to illustrate theoretical points,
as well as specific sentences for the data analysis. Each example bears the number of the
chapter it appears in, and its own reference: for instance, the first example used in
chapter 1 is referred to as (1.1). The data on the other hand, is clearly marked by the
uppercase D and a number referring to the verb dealt with, as well as a lowercase letter
for each sentence used as example. The entire database is presented in an appendix. For
example, the first verb in the database is referred to as (D1); examples of this verb as
used in discourse could be (D1a), (D1b), etc. The data will be both in English and in
French. An extension of the data can be found in chapter 4, where we specifically
investigate the pronominal forms of those verbs; in this instance, the examples we use
are clearly marked by the uppercase P.
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Chapter 1: Argument structure and transitivity: definitions

What are argument structure and transitivity ? We must begin with clear definitions of
those concepts, and of a number of related ideas.

1.1. Argument structure

1.1.1. Predication

Every sentence has something to say. What is meant can be referred to as the
predication. The predicating elements of a sentence form its nucleus, its basic meaningful
unit. They include two types of words: the arguments of the predication, and the nonarguments. According to Van Valin and LaPolla (1997), „core arguments are those
arguments which are part of the semantic representation of the verb‟ (p.26). Although
it is used by many linguists as a syntactic function, the concept of argument is primarily a
semantic concept, and we will use it as such in this study. An argument is a phrase that
holds a close meaningful relation to the predicate of a sentence. In essence, the predicate
on its own would be meaningless in the context of an utterance. One or several
arguments necessarily appear in the sentence alongside their predicate in order to form a
meaningful unit.
In a sentence like

(1.1) Yesterday Suzy carefully removed the splinters from the cut with tweezers

the predicate removed which refers to the process taking place in this utterance, and is
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expressed through the medium of a verb, does not make sense when used in isolation:

(1.2) *removed

More information is needed for any recipient to decode this message, among which at
least one agent must be specified for the process. In English, this is usually done by using
a noun as subject for the verb-predicate.

(1.3) *Suzy removed

But the meaning of (1.3) is not yet clear. In order to complete the argumentation of
remove, we must specify the object affected by the process. It is the splinters that have been
removed by Suzy. Hence the phrase

(1.4) Suzy removed the splinters

now forms a complete unit in which the predicate removed becomes meaningful.

1.1.2.

Argument versus non-argument

It is said that the verb to remove is a 2-argument verb, since it can only effect its meaning
with the help of two elements: one placed before the verb is known as the first argument
(it is represented here by Suzy and usually refers to the entity that starts the process
expressed by the verb); in this case, a second argument (the splinters) is necessary and
appears immediately after the verb; that element usually designates an entity that the
process aims to affect specifically. It is also said that the verb remove has a valency of 2.
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On the other hand, sentences also contain elements which are not indispensable to the
comprehension of the predicate. Those are the non-arguments. In many syntactic
theories, they also go by the name of „adjunct‟.
In the sentence

(1.1) Yesterday Suzy carefully removed the splinters from the cut with tweezers

we have just explained how the elements Suzy and the splinters solely are deemed
indispensable to the comprehension of the process expressed by the predicate removed.
Other types of information such as the time (yesterday) and instrument used (with tweezers)
are not directly linked to the meaning of the verb to remove, and could therefore disappear
without affecting the correctness of the sentence:

(1.4) Suzy removed the splinters

The sequence of a first argument followed by a verb, followed by a second argument is
the most frequent construction to be found in languages like English and French.
In grammatical terminology, it corresponds to the traditional SVO order of words, where
S stands for the subject (our first argument), V for the verb and O for the object (or
second argument). But not every predicate necessitates the support of two arguments in
order to fulfil its meaning. One- or three-argument structures (or verbs with a valency of
1 or 3) are also common. When a construction allows more than one argument after its
verb, the third and subsequent arguments may also be called objects. In this study, we
will use the terms „subject‟ to refer to the first argument of predication _ to be found
before the verb_ and we will restrict the term „object‟ to the second argument, that which
immediately follows the verb.
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1.1.3.

Direct versus oblique arguments

Many linguists, including Van Valin and LaPolla (1997), argue that the distinctions we
have just made are universal. That is to say that the semantic concepts of predication,
argument and non-argument, underpin the meaning of sentences in any language.
However, the manner in which those relations are formalised at a syntactic level can vary
greatly across languages.
In English, as in French, nouns and verbs usually serve as arguments. Moreover, and
crucially for us in the study with which we shall be concerned here, in many languages
some arguments are marked by prepositions, whereas others are not. This is due to a
case-marking system, which could still be active as in Icelandic, or inherited from an old
form of the language as in English or in French. Unmarked arguments are called direct
arguments, whilst marked arguments are called oblique. In traditional grammar, second
arguments which are unmarked are called direct objects, and second arguments which are
marked, i.e. are introduced by a preposition in languages such as English and French, are
called indirect objects.
However let it be noted that any word introduced by a preposition is not necessarily an
oblique argument, and that every unmarked word is not necessarily a direct argument of
the predicate. Non-arguments can also use prepositions (or not). The debate over the
best way to distinguish arguments from non-arguments is not within our remit here. In
this study, we will always try to give clear examples of predication, with unambiguous
arguments, be they either direct or oblique. For that reason, we will employ the
grammatical terminology of direct and indirect object, to avoid burdensome labels such
as „direct second argument‟ and „oblique second (or third, etc.) argument‟.

7

1.1.4.

Prominence of the arguments

In Grimshaw‟s definition „[…] argument structure represents a complex of information
critical to the syntactic behaviour of a lexical item. […] the term refers to the lexical
representation of grammatical information about a predicate. The a-structure of a lexical
item is this part of its lexical entry.‟ (Grimshaw, 1990, p.1). We had already established
that the concept of argument structure was linked to semantics since a predicate needs its
arguments in order to make sense in context; we also suspected that argument structure
participated in the determination of syntactic behaviours for its predicate, since similar
argument relations can yield various syntactic structures for a given predicate in different
languages. We can now assume that argument structure also holds a close relationship to
the lexicon. „Complex‟ of information is probably an adequate description for such a
versatile notion.
Grimshaw later fine-tunes her definition: „A-structure is a structured representation
which represents prominence relations among arguments‟ (p.4). She goes on to state that
such prominence relations are determined by thematic and aspectual considerations, but
we need not speculate on the subject in our present study. What Grimshaw establishes
here is a very relevant notion sometimes referred to as „saliency‟ or „foregrounding‟,
which we shall see more of in the course of this work. The idea that certain arguments in
the set that forms the a-structure of a predicate, are more „important‟ than others will be
central to our thinking. For instance, Grimshaw distinguishes the „external‟ argument
from the „internal‟ argument (or arguments) of a predicate. From a syntactic point of
view, an external argument is an argument which is not governed under the predicate. In
the example

(1.1) Yesterday Suzy carefully removed the splinters from the cut with tweezers
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the argument Suzy would appear under the highest node of a tree diagram, above its
predicate removed, whereas the argument the splinters is a daughter of the same predicate.
Thus „the external argument is the most prominent argument in the a-structure of a
predicate […] an argument is external or internal by virtue of its intrinsic relations to
other arguments. Its status cannot be changed except by the introduction of another
argument.‟ (p.5)
In languages such as English and French, when S-V-O sentences are used, the external
argument is realised as the subject of the verb-predicate, and the internal arguments are
its objects. The nature of the relation that links the predicate and its internal arguments
(or, to use grammatical terminology, the verb and its objects), or indeed that links the
objects among themselves, and their possible hierarchy, can now be investigated through
the concept of transitivity.

1.2.

Transitivity

Roughly, we can say that the term transitivity refers to the status of the internal
arguments, and to the relationship they hold to their predicate. There exist several sorts
of those relationships, so we will now present several syntactic structures for English and
French predicates, and discuss various issues affecting them.

1.2.1.

Intransitivity

The most basic form of transitivity is actually the absence of any transitivity for a
predicate. Some verbs convey all of their meaning without the help of any internal
argument. Such constructions are said by many linguists, including Givón (1990), to be
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common across the languages of the world, to depict mainly states (as opposed to events
or processes) and weather phenomena.
It is certainly the case in both French and English. Copular sentences of the type (1.5) to
(1.8) below all refer to states and they are all intransitive:

(1.5)

Sammy was a carpenter

(1.6)

Sammy était charpentier
Sammy was carpenter
„Sammy was a carpenter‟

(1.7)

Their dog seems sick

(1.8)

Leur fille
est
devenue
Their daughter
PAST became
„Their daughter became sad after the death

triste
sad

après la
after the

mort
death

de
son
père
of
her
father
of her father‟

In the same manner, utterances relating to the weather are also intransitive in both
languages, as in (1.9) to (1.12):

(1.9)

The sun is shining

(1.10) Le
soleil brille
The sun
shines
„The sun is shining‟
(1.11) Raindrops keep falling on my head
(1.12) La
neige tombe sur
les
sommets
The snow falls on
the
mountain tops
„Snow is falling on the mountain tops‟
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1.2.2.

Middle verbs

This type of transitivity relation refers to processes and events, and it is thus different
from intransitive constructions. However in English, like the intransitive constructions, it
is typically deprived of any internal arguments.

(1.13) Bread cuts easily

(1.14) The knife sharpens

But a translation into French of the examples above will yield very different syntactic
patterns; this shows again that similar argument structures do not necessarily mean
similar syntax, especially in a cross-linguistic context.

(1.15) Le
pain se coupe
The bread cuts
„Bread cuts easily‟

facilement
easily

(1.16) On
coupe le
One cuts the
„Bread cuts easily‟

pain facilement
bread easily

(1.17) Le
couteau
The knife
„The knife sharpens‟

s‟aiguise
sharpens

Here we can actually avail of two translations for Bread cuts easily, with very dissimilar
syntactic strategies. Example (1.15) uses a form of the verb known as pronominal, which
is common in Romance languages, but has no equivalent in English; example (1.16) uses
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a more traditional S-V-O pattern with an impersonal subject. A passive construction
could have been acceptable as well, depending on the context of the utterance. Example
(1.17) again uses the pronominal form of the verb. Whereas the on form possesses an
internal argument le pain, the se pronominal form is more ambiguous, and there exists a
point of contention among linguists on the subject of whether se must be construed as an
argument or not. We will return to such pronominal forms in the course of our study.

1.2.3.

Direct transitivity

The most frequent type of transitivity pattern to be found in both French and English is
the direct transitive one. By this we mean that the predicate‟s internal argument holds a
direct relation to that verb without the help of any preposition. Direct transitivity seems
to be associated with verbs of motion, of contact and of transformation particularly well
in both languages as the examples below demonstrate:

(1.18) Susan drove the car to the airport
(1.19) Susan a
conduit la
voiture
Susan PAST drove
the car
„Susan drove the car to the airport‟

à
to

l‟
the

aéroport
airport

(1.20) An old lady stroked the cat
(1.21) Une vieille femme caressa
An
old
lady stroked
„An old lady stroked the cat‟

le
the

chat
cat

(1.22) Les converted his garage into a gym
(1.23) Les a
transformé
son
garage
Les PAST converted
his
garage
„Les converted his garage into a gym‟
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en
in

salle de musculation
gym

In all those examples, the first internal argument _ the one closest to the verb_ is a direct
object of the verb. Note that in the above, the phrases to the airport/à l’aéroport and into a
gym/en salle de musculation may also be internal arguments of the predicate, indirect ones
we might add, as they would be linked to the verb via the prepositions to/à and into/en.
However, as it is the status of the first internal argument that typically determines the
type of transitivity to be attributed to the predicate, the verbs drove and converted will still
be called „direct transitive‟.

1.2.4.

Indirect transitivity

Unsurprisingly, we will call those predicates whose second argument comes along with a
preposition, „indirect transitive‟. Here are a few examples in both English and French.

(1.24) I spoke to the chairman of the board yesterday
(1.25) The archer aims at the target
(1.26) Tout le monde a
participé
Everyone
PAST contributed
„Everyone contributed to the party‟

à
to

la
the

soirée
party

(1.27) Salomé sort
avec
Jean-Marc depuis
trois mois
Salomé goes out
with jean-Marc for
three months
„Salomé has been going out with Jean-Marc for three months‟

In each of the above cases a preposition links the argument immediately following the
verb, to its predicate. What distinguishes a direct from an indirect relation between a
predicate and its first internal argument, is not at all obvious. We may assume that the
presence of a preposition before an indirect object, is somehow motivated; but what kind
of motivation is at stake here ? We must ask that question in the next few chapters, as it
cuts to the core of what transitivity really is. Whereas syntactic observations such as the
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presence or absence of prepositions before internal arguments may help us label
predicates, they will not assist in any way our understanding of the true nature of the
transitivity phenomenon, which, like argument structure, must be semantically motivated.

1.2.5.

Ditransitivity

There remains one major pattern of transitivity for us to investigate. Ditransitivity is a
type of argument structure in which the predicate has two direct internal arguments. It is
particularly common in English for verbs of communication, which construe both the
message and its recipient as direct internal arguments, while the sender is embodied by
the external argument. So we are dealing here with a 3-argument structure. Here are
some examples:

(1.28) Rick immediately faxed Dinah the message
(1.29) I asked you a question
(1.30) Mrs Warren told Mrs Smith the news
Of the two internal arguments, the recipient is closest to the verb and takes on the status
of first internal argument; then the message is given the status of second internal
argument.
However, there is another way to construe the same relations between those predicates
and their arguments. One could also say:

(1.31) Rick immediately faxed the message to Dinah
(1.32) Mrs Warren told the news to Mrs Smith
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Here the message is construed as the internal argument closest to the predicate, and the
recipient is now the second internal argument only. Note that in so doing, it has become
an indirect argument through the addition of a preposition to. But this alternative
argument structure is not acceptable when applied to example (1.29):

(1.33) * I asked a question to you

Therefore, we cannot assume that both constructions are absolutely synonymous. There
must be a reason why one is sometimes favoured over the other, and especially why both
constructions are not acceptable to all verbs of communication. The answer lies in the
relation between the predicate and the argument that refers to the recipient of the
communication process. In essence, we are faced here with the problem of ordering the
internal arguments; we have already seen that such ordering is based on what Grimshaw
called „prominence‟ relations. In the examples (1.28) to (1.30), the identity of the
recipient is construed as more prominent than the nature of the message itself. In (1.31)
and (1.32), it is the message which seems more important, while the identity of the
recipient recedes to the background of the process. In the sentence*I asked a question to
you, it is the recipient who matters, since the predicate ask always implies an argument
question by its own meaning; therefore the argument a question is actually a redundancy
here; it is deemed less important than the argument you. Thus the form I asked you a
question is favoured in English as you logically assumes the position of first internal
argument, while a question can only be the second internal argument.
The theory of prominence however does not explain why the recipient, when expressed
as the second internal argument, should also become indirect. This sort of enigma relates
precisely to the nature of the concept of transitivity.
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Finally we shall add a word about the way in which French deals with such ditransitive
sentences. Let us translate the examples (1.28) to (1.30):
(1.34) Rick a
immédiatement faxé le
message
Rick PAST immediately
faxed the
message
„Rick immediately faxed Dinah the message‟
(1.35) Je t‟
ai
posé une
I you
PAST asked a
„I asked you a question‟

à
to

Dinah
Dinah

question
question

(1.36) Mrs Warren a
annoncé
la
Mrs Warren PAST announced
the
„Mrs Warren told Mrs Smith the news‟

nouvelle
news

à
to

Mrs Smith
Mrs Smith

We must immediately emphasise that there seems to be no provision for ditransitivity in
the French language. The argument structure here favours a direct internal argument
followed by an indirect one. The message is construed as the first internal argument (i.e.
the direct one), and the recipient as the second internal argument, the indirect one. This
is absolutely identical to the alternative construction we have just seen for verbs of
communication in English.
How come French does not allow two direct internal arguments as English does ?
Strictly speaking, this is not absolutely accurate. Ruwet (1972) actually mentions some
examples of ditransitivity in French, of the type:
(1.37) On
a
élu
Patrice
One PAST elected
Patrice
„Patrice was elected president‟

président
president

But according to him, such examples are limited to processes dealing with positions of
authority; and one cannot help but notice that both internal arguments here, Patrice and
président, actually refer to the same person.
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Interlingual differences in the syntax of argument structure, as well as intralingual ones,
must take their roots in the semanticity of the process at stake. In other words, there
must be a semantic explanation for the impossibility of ditransitive constructions for
verbs of communication in French. It resides in the relation between the predicate and
its recipient, which appears to be construed differently in both English and French.

Having presented the key concepts pertaining to the domain of argument structure, as
well as a definition of the term itself, and having explained the main types of transitivity
available to verbs in both French and English, we can now formulate the key question
that will motivate the present study. We know that for the same argument structure,
different languages will not necessarily yield similar syntactic patterns. However, as we
shall concentrate further on the status of the first internal argument, which crucially
determines a predicate‟s transitivity, we must note again that transitivity is a remarkably
stable phenomenon across the languages of the world. Effectively, most predicates are
transitive in any language. Whether transitivity is direct or indirect, depending on the
status of the first internal argument, is a more complex and confusing issue. How does a
predicate select direct or indirect transitivity in the context of its argument structure ?
This is the question that will now concern us, and we shall start by investigating some of
the literature that deals with the nature of the concept of transitivity.
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Chapter 2: How are argument structure and transitivity determined (I):
theories of the syntax-semantics interface

Traditionally, it is assumed that there is a correlation between the semantic units that
underlie an a-structure, and the syntactic patterns that a-structure yields for its predicate.
How semantics links to syntax and/or vice-versa is the concern of three such
approaches.

2.1.

Hopper and Thompson: defining and identifying transitivity

‘...Transitivity is not dichotomous, but is a continuum,[...]’ (p. 266)

Hopper and Thompson‟s article, published in 1980, remains the authoritative reference
on the topic of transitivity. This is the „definition‟ they adopt for the concept of
transitivity: „Transitivity is traditionally understood as a global property of an entire
clause, such that an activity is „carried-over‟ or „transferred‟ from an agent to a patient.
Transitivity in the traditional view thus necessarily involves at least two participants [...],
and an action which is typically EFFECTIVE in some way‟ (p.251).1
Transitivity, they allege, can be pinpointed in discourse by a series of tell-tale signs. These
ten criteria are either morphosyntactic or semantic in nature. Each criterion in its own
way refers to „the effectiveness or intensity with which the action is transferred from one
participant to another‟ (p.252). Therefore, this transfer or carry-over between participants
is construed as more or less effective, or more or less intense. That is why transitivity is not, in

1

Hopper and Thompson do not use the words „patient‟ and „agent‟ as participant roles,
but rather as prototypical arguments. „Agent‟ stands for „1st argument‟ of the process,
and „patient‟ for „2nd argument‟.
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Hopper and Thompson‟s view, an either-or choice, but a continuum. Sentences are more
or less transitive, or to use their terminology „highly-transitive‟ or low-transitive.

We can study in detail the criteria selected by Hopper and Thompson to determine the
level of transitivity of a given sentence.
A. PARTICIPANTS
As transitivity refers to a transferring process, two participants are required. Oneparticipant sentences are deemed intransitive. However, the authors point out that many
two-participant sentences are actually intransitive across languages because it is also
preferable that, in a process of transfer, the O (or object) be animate. Many twoparticipant processes in which the second argument is inanimate, do not actually qualify
as carry-over, and cannot therefore be transitive according to Hopper and Thompson.
B. KINESIS
For any carry-over to take place, there must be some type of movement of the Object.
Whether that movement is physical or more symbolic is open to interpretation.
C. ASPECT
The two values selected by the authors are telic, corresponding to a transitive process,
and atelic, for an intransitive one. Telicity concerns the holistic interpretation of a
process: wherever it can be attributed an endpoint, the process described by the verb is
said to be telic. 1
In an incomplete process the O could be viewed as less (or not entirely) affected, while
with a perfective verb, the O would be totally transferred. Affectedness of O is another
of Hopper and Thompson‟s criteria, to which we will return shortly.

1 Those values parallel the perfective/imperfective dichotomy. In Hopper and
Thompson‟s analysis, a perfective verb is more likely to be transitive, and an imperfect
verb is more likely to be intransitive.
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D. PUNCTUALITY
A highly-transitive verb would show a tendency to carry a punctual value, whereas a lowtransitive verb would tend to be non-punctual. Non-punctuality can refer to an
imperfective, or even iterative, value, so that this analysis seems to confirm our previous
point.
E. VOLITIONALITY
As we hinted at earlier on, a highly-transitive process should involve volitional
participants. The more volitional the participants, the more transitivity there will be in the
sentence.
F. AFFIRMATION
This category actually concerns the status of negation in relation to transitivity. For any
carry-over to take place, it seems logical that an affirmative value also be applied to the
process. A process which would be denied would signal low-transitivity.
G. MODE
Hopper and Thompson oppose the realis value of indicative modes to the irrealis value
of all other modes such as the subjunctive, the conditional, the optative, etc. They
systematically link realis to high-transitivity and irrealis to low-transitivity. This
connection can be justified in the same way as the AFFIRMATIVE criterion: a process
which is put in doubt, is less likely to actually take place and is therefore a candidate for
low transitivity.
H. AGENCY
In order for any carry-over to take place, an agent should initiate the process. Preferably,
this should be an animate agent. So where evidence of agency can be found, we should
have a highly-transitive verb; where non-agency seems to be the case, low-transitivity is
more obvious.
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I. AFFECTEDNESS OF O
If a transfer occurs in the process described by the verb, the object of the sentence
should be greatly affected: an affected O is more likely to be part of a transitive clause,
but an unaffected O would be associated with an intransitive clause. Hopper and
Thompson see morphosyntactic evidence in ergative languages where case-marking
distinguishes transitive from intransitive sentences: a transitive sentence shows ergative
case-marking on A (the agent) and absolutive case-marking on O; intransitive sentences
have only one participant, i.e. A, and it is in the nominative case.
J. INDIVIDUATION OF O
Affectedness of O eventually leads to the question of the individuation of O, or to what
extent is O an independent word. Hopper and Thompson show that when O is highly
affected by a process, it will preferably be given a definite interpretation (it could be
preceded by a definite article in French or in English). But when O is less affected, it
tends to take on an indefinite value. The authors find proof that in certain languages a
less affected O is effectively incorporated into the verb, thereby losing its status as an
independent word. So a highly individuated O will be a mark of high transitivity and a
less individuated O will signal low transitivity.

Having presented convincing data from a variety of languages in support of their criteria,
Hopper and Thompson can now formulate a TRANSITIVITY HYPOTHESIS:
“If two clauses (a) and (b) in a language differ in that (a) is higher in Transitivity
according to any of the features [A-J], then, if a concomitant grammatical or
semantic difference appears elsewhere in the clause, that difference will also show
(a) to be higher in Transitivity.‟ (p.255)
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All or some of the criteria will combine to point out in the direction of transitivity or
intransitivity along a continuous scale. Clusters will form in one direction or the other,
indicating which option should be preferred.
The weakness of Hopper and Thompson‟s article however is that it does not address the
question of the syntax-semantics interface. Presumably, each language will determine a
cut-off point between them, and this may vary across languages.

Ideally, it would be helpful to regroup all the criteria under a larger concept. Hopper and
Thompson have attempted just that by linking transitivity to foregrounding.
Foregrounding is a discourse concept, not unlike Grimshaw‟s prominence relations: it
describes all manners of bringing new information into discourse against a background
of already acquired information. Ultimately the choice of transitive or intransitive clauses
would lie with the Speaker. It is (s)he who would control whether a process should be
encoded as a new piece of information, and would eventually assign it highly transitive
values, or whether it would already be known and should be intransitive in form.
Statistical proof is provided with the study of different texts. The authors remark that „in
languages like English, foregrounding is not marked absolutely, but is instead indicated
and interpreted on a probabilistic basis; and the likelihood that a clause will receive a
foregrounded interpretation is proportional to the height of that clause on the scale of
Transitivity‟ (p.286).

2.2.

Langacker: a cognitive account of transitivity

Some cognitive linguists have approached the issue of transitivity, notably Talmy (1988)
with his concept of force dynamics. Langacker (1991) offers the most elaborate model in
this field. Using the metaphor of a stage to represent sentences as plays, he distinguishes
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the setting from the participants: whereas in discourse the setting of a „play‟ is provided
by adverbials of time and space for instance, the actors (or participants) in the play are
the objects and the subjects that engage in interactions. A sentence thus illustrates a
process of „energy transmission‟ between the participants. Sentence structure is the
reflection of that process. A sentence is essentially the expression of an „action chain‟ in
which a „head‟ emits energy towards another participant; the second participant in turn
can transmit this energy to a third entity, and so on. This „action chain‟ can continue until
a participant interrupts the transmission of the energy flow by absorbing it. The last
participant in the chain is called the „tail‟. For instance, in the sentence

(2.1)

At lunchtime Frederick ate soup with a fork

Frederick is the source (or „head‟ of the action chain) which transmits energy to a fork
which in turn plunges into the soup. The process ends there with the soup as the tail of
the chain. This whole process involves physical contact between Frederick and the fork,
and between the fork and the soup. But action chains also apply to mental processes
according to Langacker.

(2.2)

The children are watching television

In this example, the children initiate an action chain which is clearly directed at the
television. Even though no physical contact happens between the two participants, the
flow of energy is no less real in cognitive terms. Instead of „head‟ and „tail‟, Langacker
speaks of „experiencer‟ and „experienced‟.
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With his model, Langacker believes that he can explain different types of argument
structures. According to him, the number of arguments expressed in a sentence reflects
the number of participants of the action chain that the speaker wishes to mention. The
choice of which argument becomes the subject also relies on the number of participants
and the direction of the energy flow. For instance, a middle construction such as

(2.3)

The channel changed

is the result of an action chain in which the speaker focuses solely on the last participant
affected by the process: here, the channel is the tail of the action chain.
But a typically transitive sentence like

(2.4)

Paula changed the channel

mentions both the head of the energy flow (Paula) and its tail (the channel). The head
assumes the subject position, and the tail is the object.
Eventually, Langacker also accounts for instrumental constructions of the type

(2.5)

Paula changed the channel with the remote control

Here the action chain is as follows:

(2.6)

Paula



the remote control



the channel

We must note that, although the channel is the tail of the chain, it does not occupy the
last argument-slot in the corresponding sentence. That is because Langacker‟s conception
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of energy transmission does not in any way assess prominence. His is a linear, time-based
model. But let us remember that the ordering of arguments in syntactic frames is the
result of prominence relations among the participants.
Finally, Langacker also provides his own explanation for ditransitive sentences. In his
opinion, sentences such as

(2.7)

Bríd gave Paul the keys

are not the result of a simple causal chain that would result in Paul getting the keys.
It is rather a combination of the physical process of Bríd handing the keys to Paul, and of
the mental process of Paul acknowledging his receiving them. Not everyone agrees with
this conception however.

We now know enough of Langacker‟s model to support Hopper and Thompson‟s
definition of transitivity as a „transfer‟, with a cognitive basis. Transitivity is a transfer of
energy, either physical or mental, between participants. However this cognitive view
cannot explain the ordering of arguments within a syntactic frame, so we will now return
to our investigation of the syntax-semantics interface.

2.3.

Van Valin and LaPolla: searching for linking rules

In Syntax: structure, meaning and function (1997), Van Valin and LaPolla elaborate a theory of
how to link semantics to syntax and vice-versa. We will limit ourselves to their account
of the linkage of argument structure.
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In their view, every sentence involving a verb describes a state of affair in the world,
which is a combination of two elements: the predication, as expressed by the verb itself,
and the reference, i.e. the participants of the predication process (subjects, objects or
oblique participants). From a semantic perspective, participant roles are varied and
numerous. Van Valin and LaPolla use an exhaustive list of participant roles in their
theory, such as AGENT, EFFECTOR, EXPERIENCER, INSTRUMENT, FORCE,
PATIENT, THEME, BENEFACTIVE, RECIPIENT, GOAL, SOURCE, LOCATION
and PATH. Predication also covers a wide range of situations, and here VanValin and
LaPolla refer to the theory of Aktionsart as presented by Vendler (1967). In parallel with
the concepts of situation, event, process and action described in Aktionsart, they propose
the terms state, activity, accomplishment and achievement, which actually correspond to
Vendler‟s classification. It is not of direct interest to us to try and classify verbs in this
manner, other than because this system forms the basis of what the authors term the
Logical Structure (or LS) of a verb.

Each verb in the lexicon is assigned a Logical Structure that paraphrases how the
participants involved in the process described by this verb actually relate to/act upon
one another. Therefore LS integrates both predication and reference in order to give
as complete and accurate a description of the meaning of the verb as is possible.
An example of Logical Structure for the verb to show in the sentence Mary showed the
photograph to Sam goes like this:

(2.8) [do‟(Mary,Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME see‟ (Sam, photograph)]

Once established the Logical Structure will help us determine the valency, transitivity and
macroroles used by the verb to form its syntactic output. Van Valin and LaPolla only use
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the notion of macroroles in their theory. The macroroles are the participants most closely
related to the predication. There are usually two of them, an Actor and an Undergoer,
although this may change to one or even zero. The actor is an AGENT-type participant;
it is the driving force behind the process referred to by the verb. Van Valin and LaPolla
note that not only AGENT participant roles may be eligible for this function but also
EXPERIENCER, INSTRUMENT, RECIPIENT, SOURCE or FORCE. They most
often translate into the syntactic function of subject of an active verb in languages like
English and French. But let us remember that this is certainly not systematic across
languages. The Undergoer is the entity most affected by the predication; it is therefore a
PATIENT-type participant, but this macrorole may also be undertaken by THEME,
RECIPIENT, SOURCE or LOCATION participant roles, in that order of preference.
The Undergoer function usually appears as the object of an active verb. Macroroles
therefore play a pivotal part in the transition from the semantic form of a verb to its
syntactic realisation, and vice-versa. „Macroroles are generalizations across the argumenttypes found with particular verbs which have significant grammatical consequences; it is
they, rather than specific arguments in logical structure, that grammatical rules refer to
primarily‟ (p.139). When assigning semantic participants to particular syntactic functions,
the macroroles will be considered first.

Having established the nature of semantic participant roles on the one hand and the
macroroles as the priority syntactic functions on the other hand, we can now examine
Van Valin and LaPolla‟s idea of the interface between the syntax and the semantics of
verbs. Actually selecting which participant role will be the Actor and which will be the
Undergoer, is not a black-and-white decision. Rather, it follows a continuum which the
authors call the Actor-Undergoer Hierarchy:
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ACTOR

UNDERGOER

------------------------------------------------------------->
<--------------------------------------------------------argument

1st argument

1st argument

of DO

of do‟(x,...

of pred‟(x,y)

2nd argument
of pred‟(x,y)

argument of state
pred‟(x)

The participant role most likely to take on the role of Actor is an AGENT one. Then
that Actor must be assigned a syntactic function in the sentence. The Actor-Undergoer
Hierarchy model tells us that if the verb is an intransitive verb (a predicate involving
agency), then the participant selected as its Actor will be assigned to the function of sole
argument of that verb. If the verb involved is a transitive DO one, with two arguments,
then the participant selected as Actor will take on the function of first argument for that
verb.
At the other end of the scale, once a participant role has been selected as Undergoer (a
PATIENT-type is preferable), it must also be assigned a syntactic function. The
prototypical link is between Undergoer and the sole argument of an intransitive
pred‟verb, ie. a predicate which does not involve agency. Where the verb involved is a 2argument transitive predicate, the Undergoer will be assigned the function of second
argument.1

The linking process from the macrorole to a corresponding syntactic position (Van Valin
and LaPolla call it Privileged Syntactic Argument or PSA) is not identical for every

1

But the assignment process is not so clearcut when we have to deal with a 2-place
predicate. Other semantic or pragmatic influences on the sentence might lead us to select
the position of 1st argument for the Undergoer over the Actor. This is what happens in
an English or French passive sentence where the Undergoer appears as the subject, and
the Actor as an oblique argument.
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language. Whereas participant roles, and probably their mapping onto the macrorole
functions of Actor and Undergoer according to a strict hierarchy, could be universal,
they suggest that the interface between the macroroles and the syntax is subject to
language-specific variations.

2.4.

Givón: from case-roles to syntactic patterns

In Syntax: a functional-typological approach (1984), Givón tackles „the case-marking behaviour
of the verb‟s argument‟ (p.86). Where Van Valin and LaPolla proposed four types of
verbs, he acknowledges three across languages: states, events and actions. In each case,
the second argument is gradually more affected by the process, so that events are more
likely to engender transitive clauses than states, and actions even more so than events.
So, along with Hopper and Thompson, Givón agrees that „transitivity is a matter of
degree‟ (p.98).
He also bases his account of transitivity on semantic case-roles. He distinguishes the
major case-roles like PATIENT, DATIVE and AGENT from the minor case-roles of
BENEFACTIVE, LOCATIVE, INSTRUMENTAL and ASSOCIATIVE; later, he also
adds the semantic roles of TIME, PURPOSE and INTENT1.
Along with Hopper and Thompson, Givón agrees that transitivity only affects twoargument verbs. In his model, a prototypical transitive verb presents the following
pattern:

an agent

+

a verb of change

as subject

+

a patient-of-change
as object
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The very notion of a prototypical transitive pattern allows for less prototypical
alternatives. Either the case of the object (i.e. PATIENT), or the case of the subject
(i.e. AGENT) may change. As far as our study is concerned, only the former will be of
relevance.
According to Givón, concepts such as humanity, animacy, agentiveness and volitionality
all affect the transitive process. He argues that the core issue is saliency, a notion not
unlike Hopper and Thompson‟s background/foreground distinction or Grimshaw‟s
prominence. In pragmatic terms, the more salient the participant is within the process (or
the more affected it is by the process), the more chances it has of being interpreted either
as the subject of that process or as its transitively direct object.

The distinction between transitively direct and transitively indirect objects is therefore
very simple in Givón‟s terms: the IO is „not an affected patient‟ (p.109). It is then more
likely to be introduced by a suffix or prefix (in the case of French or English, a
preposition). This is akin to saying that an IO is less topical or salient than a DO.
Certain semantic roles are more eligible for the function of IO than the prototypical
PATIENT-direct object: they are the LOCATIVE, the DATIVE, the ASSOCIATIVE,
the BENEFACTIVE and the INSTRUMENTAL.

„[...] we discussed various types of participants in states, events and actions. We defined
them as the most common semantic case-roles found in human language. While these
case-roles are considered universal, it is not the case that all languages code them
syntactically in the same way‟ (p.135). This is in simple terms the issue with which we are

This classification only very partially recoups that of Van Valin and LaPolla, but neither
they nor Givón are striving for an exhaustive catalogue of all semantic cases, as this is
clearly a matter of personal interpretation.
1
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concerning ourselves. Givón calls it „the functional dilemma‟ and gives it the following
definition:

„Functional dilemma in objectization:
“How to express simultaneously the semantic case-role of an argument and its pragmatic
case-role as secondary topic (i.e. DO)” ‟ (p.169).

There is interplay between a semantic level involving participants with certain semantic
case-roles, and a pragmatic level which determines the syntactic functions of subject and
direct object. Givón‟s originality is to introduce the notion of pragmatics in order to
explain the syntax-semantics interface. What he calls subject and direct object in a
grammatical terminology, he also calls primary and secondary clause topics in a pragmatic
perspective. This is actually the same as the concepts of macroroles defined by Van Valin
and LaPolla.1
How do semantic roles translate into direct (or indirect) object then ? Objectisation
prototypically selects a PATIENT role as the direct object of a verb‟s process. If none
can be found, promotion to DO must take place; this is defined as „the placing, by
whatever grammatical means, of a non-patient object into the position of direct object,
whose grammatical coding (most commonly by morphology) is otherwise characteristic
of patient objects‟ (p.172).
There is, according to Givón, a „hierarchy of access to direct objecthood‟:
DAT/BEN > PAT > LOC > INSTR/ASSOC > MANN

1

Of course, Givón‟s choice of the terms „subject‟ and „direct object‟ to refer to the
macroroles, is only acceptable to the extent that the macroroles actually translate into
those grammatical functions. We know that this is not always the case across languages.
But Givón is aiming at simplicity via his prototypical model.
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However we are now faced with a paradox: in a process of promotion to DO, can the
participant afford to lose its semantic marking (i.e. the preposition that usually indicates
its semantic case-role) ? The issue is clarity: wherever the verb‟s meaning is semantically
linked to that of the participant being promoted, the latter‟s semantic value should not be
lost, and promotion will not engender confusion; alternatively, if there are no other
preposition-less participants in the clause, then again, confusion will be avoided and
promotion to DO by loss of the preposition, can take place without fear of losing the
semantic specificity of the participant being promoted. It is paramount in any case to
preserve the semantic case-role of the participants since, „by losing their original semantic
case-role markers to become DO, non-patient objects increase their probability of being
semantically misinterpreted‟ (p. 182).
Givón insists on every language‟s need to balance case-marking with case-differentiation.
Case-differentiation is a semantic concept that refers to the obviousness with which we
can identify the semantic role of a participant; case-marking is a morphosyntactic concept
referring to the way in which a language encodes case-differentiation. „Case-marking
systems [...] are not made to explicitly mark every argument, but rather _ ideally_ to
maximally differentiate between arguments in actual sentential contexts‟ (p.184).
It is not always necessary to explicit a participant‟s semantic role with morphosyntactic
indicators such as prepositions. A principle of economy actually dictates that, if the
context of the sentence poses no ambiguity, this should be avoided.

Hopper and Thompson, Van Valin and LaPolla, and Givón all believe in a set of linking
rules that would interface the syntax of a predicate with the semantic values of its
arguments. Langacker provides a cognitive basis for this approach. How it would work in
the detail is nevertheless a point of debate. Hopper and Thompson completely avoid the
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issue; instead they highlight the values of both predicates and arguments that exert an
influence over transitivity. Van Valin and LaPolla refer to an intermediate plane they call
the macroroles; those are the two arguments most closely related to the predicate,
although the nature of this „closeness‟ is not clearly explained. Givón also uses an
intermediate level, that of pragmatics. The notion of saliency he introduces strongly
echoes Hopper and Thompson‟s foregrounding, Langacker‟s chain reactions and even
Grimshaw‟s prominence, as seen in chapter 1. But we are not yet satisfied as to how
those prominence relations among arguments may translate into syntax.
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Chapter 3: How are argument structure and transitivity determined (II):
approaches from lexical-semantics

More recently, researchers in the field of lexical-semantics have challenged the notion of
an exclusive and systematic interface between the domains of syntax and semantics. They
are now re-examining the whole area of argument structure from the point of view of an
individual verb‟s lexical characteristics.

3.1.

Wechsler: restricted and unrestricted arguments

In his 1995 study The Semantic basis of Argument Structure, Wechsler reinvestigates the
theories of the syntax-semantics interface. He identifies two main approaches: one is
through a set of thematic roles, which must be universal. Givón‟s case-roles, Van Valin
and LaPolla‟s participants hail from that school. But Wechsler points out to the difficulty
of defining a universal set of thematic-roles, as we already have in chapter 2. The other is
through the categorisation of the predicates themselves into different types, as was
attempted by Jackendoff (1990). The theory of Aktionsart (from which Van Valin and
LaPolla also drew inspiration) had already explored the same territory.

Both approaches seem too complex to Wechsler. He claims to be able to account for the
determination of all cases of argument structures in three simple steps only.
Step 1 seeks ordering rules to determine the order in which the arguments appear in the astructure. As neither thematic roles, nor classification of predicates has succeeded yet in
finding a complete explanation, Wechsler ventures that „[…] the appropriate semantic
basis involves primitives of an even more abstract and general sort, and that there are
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very few in number. Indeed there may only be one or two of them‟ (p.2). However he
does not go as far as identifying them.
The second step identifies semantically restricted complements: some argument NPs are
specifically marked in a language as belonging to certain semantic relations. They are
identified by case-marking, or with a preposition for instance. Other argument NPs are
unrestricted. In as far as it considers NPs individually, and since the semantic relations
that hold between them and their markers may be part of their lexical entries, there is a
strong possibility that the notion of restriction of arguments is lexically based.
Thirdly, the isomorphy condition also concerns the order of arguments. It explains how
unrestricted (i.e. unmarked) arguments must remain in the same slot as was determined
by their thematic role, whereas restricted arguments can move around the sentence, since
their marker makes it easier to identify the semantic relations they enter in. Unrestricted
arguments only have their position within the a-structure to convey such information. If
they switch place, they lose that vital link and their meaning is obscured. This notion is
reminiscent of English ditransitive sentences.

With his approach, Wechsler gets rid of some cumbersome labels and rigid linking rules,
but general categorisations are fading. On the one hand, thematic roles are still linking to
argument slots. But on the other hand, we find a seemingly endless series of semantic
relations, signalled by particular markers in each case, for each individual NP. Effectively,
Wechsler has reintroduced the notion of lexical specificity into the determination of
argument structure.
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3.2.

Gawron: a new look at oblique complements

In his theory, Wechsler refers to the work of Gawron while dealing with oblique
complements. According to Wechsler, oblique complements are restricted (and often
marked by a preposition in French or in English). They are also outside the argument
structure of the predicate, but may be linked to one of its arguments. For example, in the
sentence

(3.1)

Try to avoid smearing the drawing with charcoal

the NP the drawing is the internal argument of the predicate smearing, but with charcoal is
not a direct argument of that predicate. Instead, it is an oblique argument linked to the
internal argument the drawing.

But how do oblique arguments acquire their markers ? Gawron estimates that „a
preposition has semantic content, rather than simply tagging a complement of the verb‟
(id, p.66). Take the preposition for: „ [it] occurs with a class of verbs having to do with
desire: wish, hope, pray, ask, long, try, hunger and yearn. If we posit a relation DESIRE which
is a component for all these verbs, and use DESIRE as the lexical relation for one
meaning of the preposition for, then for will be eligible to mark arguments with any of
them. The Argument Principle does not require us to do so; it merely licenses the
subcategorization as a possible valence for the grammar‟ (Gawron, 1986, p.344).
In essence, if one semantic value of the preposition is compatible with one semantic
value of the verb, then both can co-occur. They will not necessarily do so: for instance,
English uses the phrase to yearn for but the prepositionless verb to desire.
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„This means that the direct/oblique distinction cannot be derived from the semantics but
must be lexically stipulated, at least in some cases‟ (p.69). There would be in effect two
types of oblique arguments: one that would be determined by the predicate within the
confines of its a-structure; and one that would emanate from a special semantic bond
between the verb and the preposition itself. The latter could only be stipulated in the
verb‟s lexical entry, making the determination of argument structure at least partially
lexically-based.

3.3.

Levin: looking at diathesis alternations

English verb classes and alternations (1993) is a comprehensive work by Beth Levin which
classifies over 5000 English verbs into semantic categories determined by their syntactic
behaviour. „This work is guided by the assumption that the behaviour of a verb,
particularly with respect to the expression and interpretation of its arguments, is to a
large extent determined by its meaning. Thus verb behaviour can be used effectively to
probe for linguistically relevant pertinent aspects of verb meaning‟ (p.1). Unlike any of
the authors we have seen so far, Levin courageously takes a stand and places semantics
before syntax.

Working backwards so to speak, Levin analyses the syntactic behaviour of English verbs,
in particular the alternations they allow between different syntactic constructions. She
then formulates hypotheses as to the semantic reasons that motivate the different
constructions for a given verb. For instance, she proposes that the middle transitivity
alternation (or alternation between a middle form and a transitive form for the same
predicate) is available only to those verbs whose meaning involves causing a change of state.
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She also famously examined the alternations of the four verbs cut, hit, touch and break. She
came to the conclusion that touch, hit and cut must display common semantic features
since they all allow the conative alternation (where the second argument is introduced by
the preposition at); she termed them verbs of contact. But they also entered into different
alternations, and were therefore to be considered variants of the common semantic core.
„Touch is a pure verb of contact, hit is a verb of contact by motion, cut is a verb of
causing a change of state by moving something into contact with the entity that changes
state, and break is a pure verb of change of state‟ (p.10).
„If the distinctive behaviour of verb classes with respect to diathesis alternations arises
from their meaning, any class of verbs whose members pattern together with respect to
diathesis alternations should be a semantically coherent class: its members should share
at least some aspect of meaning‟ (p.14).

Levin classifies dozens of verb alternations in her work, but we are specifically concerned
with those diathesis alternations that involve a shift between a direct transitive argument
structure and an indirect transitive argument structure. For example, the conative
alternation involves one structure in which the preposition at is used to introduce the
second argument of the sentence, and another structure where the preposition is
dropped. Sentences such as He hit the door and He hit at the door are alternatives, and a
semantic interpretation would distinguish between them on the basis of a notion of goal:
the door is the goal towards which the hit is directed in He hit at the door, whereas goal is
irrelevant in He hit the door, therefore the preposition can be dropped.
Other examples of preposition-drop alternations can be found with other types of
prepositions, notably locative prepositions. The horse can jump the fence is a variant for The
horse can jump over the fence; She walked around in circles is a variant of She walked in circles, etc.
With preposition-drop alternations are also frequent with verbs of social interaction: one
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can say We met with them yesterday as well as We met them yesterday: the difference seems to be
one of intensionality.
We must also note alternations concerning ditransitive constructions. The dative
alternation is one such: we already know from chapter 1 that a construction of the type
Bríd gave the keys to Paul will easily translate into French, but its double object variant Bríd
gave Paul the keys will not, as French does not allow double direct objects. What semantic
motivation can be found for such an alternation should prove crucial in explaining
English/French contrasts.

Levin‟s work on diathesis alternations reveals an approach to argument structure and
transitivity based on the observation of individual verbs, in other terms, a lexical
approach. Verbs can pattern together into conflation classes, based on the alternations
they have in common. But those diathesis alternations are determined by the semantic
roles of the arguments, which are themselves a reflection of the individual semantic
values contained within the verbs‟ own lexical entries.

3.4.

Pinker: furthering the lexical-semantics approach

In Learnability and cognition: the acquisition of argument structure (1989), Pinker discusses
„Baker‟s paradox‟ or how do children acquire the argument structures of verbs, when
they cannot benefit from much negative evidence in the discourses they are exposed to ?
In other words, how do we know what is acceptable or what is not, in terms of argument
structures, if we are not told so explicitly ?

A-structure is only part of a verb‟s lexical entry according to Pinker. The latter should
also comprise morphological and phonological information about the predicate, its part-
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of-speech category and its meaning or semantic structure. Any modification in this
information will yield a new lexical entry, effectively corresponding to a new word.
Therefore, Pinker assumes that „the same verb used with two different argument
structures actually consists of two distinct lexical entries sharing a morphological root
and components of their semantic structures‟ (p.71-72). Note that certain semantic
components only can be shared by the two words in this view, because the correlation
between the semantic structure of a word and its syntactic structure is so close that
modifying the one automatically modifies the other. Therefore no two words could share
every component of their meaning, and behave differently from the point of view of
their argument structure. If two verbs were to have the same semantic entry, they would
be one and the same.

„Semantic structures are mapped onto syntactic argument structures, thanks to linking
rules, so when the verb‟s meaning changes, its argument structure changes too, as an
automatic consequence‟ (p.63). Pinker deems that those linking rules are systematic.
Although his classification of verbs is somewhat different from those we have seen
before, what he proposes here has already been observed elsewhere and can be
paraphrased as follows:
- Rule 1 states that an AGENT should take on the role of subject, and this should be
systematically applied where a form of causative verb is concerned.
- Rule 2 states that the PATIENT of such a causative verb should be linked to the object
position; these two rules taken together are very reminiscent of Givón‟ prototypical
model of transitivity.
- Rule 3 states that the THEME of a state verb or of a motion verb should preferably be
linked to the subject position, or if this is not possible, to the object position. This is
compatible with analyses such as Givón‟s, and Van Valin and Lapolla‟s: the former stated
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that the AGENT would assume the subject position over a THEME, and the latter that
the PATIENT would do so, if the case arose.
- Rule 4 states that the GOAL in a directed motion process should be linked to the verb
indirectly, via use of the preposition to. This is not very surprising for English.
- Rule 5 states that the THEME in a transfer of possession process, should take the
position of second object, which is the same as saying that all transfers of possession can
yield ditransitive constructions.

Those mechanisms are much more constraining than any approach we had explored so
far. Pinker acknowledges that, on the topic of linking rules, he is somewhat at odds with
researchers such as Jackendoff, Rappaport and Levin. The principal disagreement centers
around the issue of how many linking rules are needed to account for the whole area of
argument structures. However Pinker himself accepts that there are narrow-range rules,
next to the broad-range rules he has proposed. The broad-range rules are „classwise and
property-predicting‟, i.e. they pertain to (semantic) classes of verbs, whereas the narrowrange rules are „itemwise and existence-predicting‟: narrow-range rules will only apply to
specific lexical items, and will only predict which argument structures are possible for a
particular verb.

Is there redundancy in this approach ? Ideally, Pinker would like to see all narrow-range
rules replaced by broad-range rules that could encompass all the smaller rules below
them, edicting mechanisms for whole classes of verbs rather than for individual verbs.
„First, the broad-range rules determine what all the narrow-range rules have in common
[...]. Second, the motivation for why certain subclasses alternate and others don‟t is
provided by the broad-range rules‟ (p.152). On the other hand, there is no evidence that
what seems to be the shortest route to solving Baker‟s paradox, is actually the favoured
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way of first language learners: it is entirely plausible that children learn argument
structures through individual verbs, and accumulate narrow-range rules. Moreover,
Pinker has found some evidence that „narrow-range rules can be sensitive to the presence
of the full set of arguments accompanying a verb, including optional path constituents
[oblique arguments]‟(p.227). For example, two narrow-range rules will be needed to yield
She rolled the ball into the box, and She rolled the ball. Although Pinker is confident that a
broad-range rule can capture this alternation, narrow-range rules can provide certain
useful details.

What this distinction between narrow- and broad-range rules reveals nevertheless, is the
likeliness (already strongly supported by Levin‟s work) that verbs can be conflated into
semantic classes that will demonstrate evidence of common argument structures and
alternations. Such conflation classes are to be organised around a thematic core: „a
thematic core is the schematisation of a type of event or relationship that lies at the core
of the meaning of a class of possible verbs‟ (p.73). All verbs included in a particular
conflation class will share that core feature and display similar argument structure
patterns. Conversely, such conflation classes can be used to explain why some verbs do
not participate in certain alternations for instance: an explanation could be that „such
verbs are clearly ruled out because they are cognitively incompatible with a thematic core
associated with the argument structure‟ (p.98).

Pinker proposes that argument structure lies at the crossroads of the three domains of
syntax, semantics and the lexicon. On the one hand, he clearly stipulates that a-structure
is part of a verb‟s lexical entry, confirming our suspicion that close links exist between
syntax and the lexicon. And on the other hand, he too believes in conflation classes
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organised around core semantic values, in other words he endorses the concept of a
syntax-semantics interface.

3.5.

Lexical-semantics and cognitive linguistics

Here again we are able to draw some interesting parallels between a school of semantics
and cognitive research. Both lexical semantics and cognitive linguistics display a similar
approach to words in as much as semantic values are perceived as an intrinsic part of any
lexical item. In turn, those values influence the use of words by speakers in a discourse
context. For lexical semanticists, semantic values pertaining to an individual lexical item
are encoded in its l-entry. They trigger linking rules to certain syntactic behaviours; for
instance, in the case of predicates, lexical-semantic values directly link to argument slots.
For cognitive linguists, the semantic values attributed to lexical items also determine their
selection in sentences. This cognitive view really is the foundation of the lexicalsemantics approach. It explains how a word is chosen for use in a sentence in the first
place, because of the semantic values it encapsulates. Then lexical-semantics can analyse
how those values influence its syntactic role within the sentence.

With this reasoning, cognitive research has been particularly adept at describing the
semanticity and behaviour of prepositions. Along with Langacker‟s ideas as seen in our
second chapter, this school is part of the „prominence‟ view of cognitive linguistics.
Whereas Langacker used the concept of prominence to offer a cognitive explanation of
transitivity, other cognitivists base their analyses of prepositions on the dichotomy of
figure vs. ground. To them, human perception is constantly striving to distinguish
prominent objects from background objects. Prominent objects are known as „figures‟
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that stand against a „ground‟ of less important objects. Language focuses essentially on
the description of figures.
In their opinion, the role of prepositions is first and foremost to convey information
about location. Where location and possibly movement, are involved, cognitive linguists
will use the terms „trajector‟ for a moving figure, and „landmark‟ for its motionless
ground. A preposition‟s basic locative value is expressed by means of an image schema _
a visual representation of its prototypical use, as it is perceived by our senses. But
prepositions tend to extend their applications beyond their locative basis, into other
cognitive domains. That is why its central schema gives rise to less prototypical
„elaborations‟, and even to metaphorical extensions of a given preposition.

Famous examples of prepositions‟ cognitive analyses as reported by Ungerer and Schmid
(1996) include OVER by Lakoff (1987) and OUT by Lindner (1982). We shall add the
French preposition A by Vandeloise (1991) in order to demonstrate that this particular
school of cognitive linguistics is not confined to the English language.
Basic definitions for those prepositions go as follows:
-

OVER: „a trajectory moving along a path that is above the landmark and goes
from one end of the landmark to the other and beyond‟ (Ungerer and Schmid,
1996, p.162)

An example is found in the sentence

(3.2)

The plane flew over

Here the plane is the trajector flying over a fixed landmark, which is understood to be
the Speaker.
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-

OUT: the trajector moves in such a way that, eventually, it is no longer within the
boundaries of the landmark

(3.3)

She went out

This sentence sees a trajector she moving out of a landmark area such as the room.
-

A: a trajector is moving towards a landmark so distant that its shape, size and
characteristics are not visible (in an image schema, the landmark is represented as
a dot). There is a strong sense of a path leading to that landmark.

(3.4)

L‟
empereur
est
à
The emperor
is
at
„The emperor is at the beach‟

la
the

plage
beach

Here the Speaker describes an imaginary path followed by his eye in order to locate
the emperor at a distant landmark of no definite physical characteristics. The
landmark clearly is the beach, but the trajector is not the emperor: it is the Speaker
himself.
Elaborations on those basic meanings include such examples as

(3.5)

Sam drove over the bridge

(3.6)

He picked out two pieces of candy

In the first example, the basic image schema for OVER is slightly modified in as much as
there is now physical contact between the trajector Sam and the landmark the bridge.
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In the second example, the landmark candy is no longer construed as a homogeneous
entity, but as a group of individual items. Such variations on the core locative meanings
of prepositions are numerous.
Finally, those core values can be further extended when used in conjunction with
metaphors. In the example below, the central schema for OVER is superimposed on two
commonly used metaphors: one refers to life as a journey, and the other sees problems as
obstacles in one‟s path.

(3.7)

Harry still hasn‟t got over his divorce

We are now far from the initial locative sense of OVER, but the image used here implies
that the trajector Harry must overcome the landmark divorce in much the same manner as
the plane used to fly overhead in (3.2).

Aside from Gawron, who in his conception of the selection of prepositions implied that
argument structure at large was determined at the level of lexical semantics, all the other
linguists reviewed in this section used a model of interface between semantics and syntax.
However they all found that those models could never account for the totality of
argument structures (therefore, of transitive constructions). In all cases, reference was
made to a level of interface between the lexicon and semantics. Semantic values were
always attributed directly to the predicates, or to their arguments. Cognitive linguistics
helped us strengthen this case by providing information about how the semantic values
attributed to prepositions for instance, influenced their use in discourse. As a component
of the words themselves _ of their lexical entry_, every time the semantic values are
accessed in order to determine at least part of the syntactic forms of predicates, a direct
link is established between the lexicon and syntax.
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Chapter 4: The determination of transitivity status
4.1.

The theoretical viewpoint

Our overview of current approaches to the problem of determination of argument
structure has opposed two schools. On the one hand, some linguists are looking for an
answer in the links that would bond together the syntactic and semantic levels of a
predicate: they are seeking to establish the rules of an interface. On the other hand, other
researchers are investigating the direct links that would exist between syntax and the
lexicon: some syntactic patterns would not be attached to the semantic values of the
predicate, but encoded in its l-entry. Both approaches find some elements of justification
in those cognitive views of language that favour prominence as the basis for the selection
and ordering of lexical items in a sentence. Whether a syntax-semantics interface would
use an intermediate plane made of macroroles, as proposed by VanValin and LaPolla, or
indeed whether the principle is founded at all, is not our direct concern in this study, but
looking at transitivity may imply for us to make up our mind on the issue of the
determination of argument structure as a whole. So why and how is a status of indirect
transitivity conferred upon certain arguments ?
The first school would assume the existence of a semantic value for each preposition
used to introduce indirect transitive arguments, or even the notion of a unique semantic
value to encompass the very notion of indirect transitivity itself. The second school
would treat each predicate individually and assume a status of indirect transitivity to be
part of its lexical make-up. The two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive; in
Pinker‟s, Levin‟s and Wechsler‟s work, there is always the possibility for both to co-exist.
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We will seek to validate either (or maybe both) „theories‟ through our data analysis. At
every stage, we should keep in mind a few notions that have re-occurred through the
literature.
Firstly, prominence relations seem paramount in the ordering of arguments. For us, this
means in particular that a second argument is less salient than a first argument, but more
salient than a non-argument. We might wonder how this hierarchy may affect the issue
of direct vs. indirect transitivity as well.
Secondly, we must remember at all times that arguments correspond to participants to
which certain semantic values have been attributed. Some of these values recur in the
determination process and must be paid particular attention to.
Finally, the selection of transitivity status may not only be a problem of case-marking,
but also of case-differentiation. Every marked argument should see its marking
motivated by semanticity, and the choice of preposition might give us a clue as to which
semantic values are at stake. But conversely, an unmarked argument might not
necessarily be devoid of semanticity: it may simply be suppressing its markers for the
sake of economy. In our data, we must be careful in attributing semantic values to the
participants that act as arguments, be they direct or indirect.

In a nutshell, there are three steps to the question of how indirect transitivity is
determined:
-

1 concerns the overall determination of the predicate‟s a-structure;

-

2 is the actual selection of indirect versus direct transitivity for the second
argument;

-

3 relates to the choice of a preposition where indirect transitivity has been
selected.
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Although step 2 constitutes our topic, it can hardly be examined in isolation from steps 1
and 3.

4.2.

The data: a study of interlingual differences in a-structures

Both the theory of the syntax-semantics interface and the theory of lexical-semantics
assume that languages analyse the semantic values contained within/ associated with
verbal items, in order to determine the syntactic form of their a-structure. If we observed
verbs with an assumed identical meaning in two different languages such as English and
French, but with different syntactic patterns, especially in regard to their transitivity
status, we would be in a position to explore this hypothesis. Why should verbs of
identical meaning behave differently from the point of view of their transitivity across
languages ? Let us remember at this point that the transitivity issue has long impressed
linguists by its remarkable cross-linguistic consistency. Therefore the data we are about
to investigate in this study should be considered exceptional behaviour, rather than the
norm.

The data we will use presents a list of verbs that behave in a direct transitive fashion in
English, but in an indirect transitive manner in French. They introduce a preposition
between the verb and the object in French, where there is none in English.
The verbs were selected using Levin‟s English verb classes and alternations (1993) as a starting
point because of its extensive classification of verbs. Personal observations were also
added. We retained only those verbs that showed interlingual difference in transitivity
when used with a noun phrase as object, as inclusion of verbal objects would have
created a much larger and much more complex database. Were the present study to lead
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to hypotheses testing in the future, we also narrowed down the list to verbs commonly
used and easily understood by an average language learner of intermediate level.
All utterances were taken from or inspired by the Collins Cobuild English Language
Dictionary (1987), which draws its examples from authentic English language texts with
the help of a concordancer. The data was then translated into French. Only verbs that
could translate as one word were retained: verbal phrases such as faire pression sur quelqu’un
for to press someone, or aller bien à quelqu’un for to suit someone were dismissed.
The data includes 20 verbs:

(D1)

to answer/ répondre à

(D2)

to ask/ demander à

(D3)

to change/ changer de

(D4)

to decide/ décider de

(D5)

to divorce/ divorcer de

(D6)

to doubt/ douter de

(D7)

to enjoy/ jouir de

(D8)

to escape/ échapper à

(D9)

to fax/ faxer à

(D10) to forgive/ pardonner à
(D11) to leave/ partir de
(D12) to obey/ obéir à - to disobey/ désobéir à
(D13) to phone/ téléphoner à
(D14) to press/ appuyer sur
(D15) to renounce/ renoncer à
(D16) to resemble/ ressembler à
(D17) to resist/ résister à
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(D18) to suit/ convenir à
(D19) to telegraph/ télégraphier à
(D20) to value/ tenir à

Our appendix contains prototypical examples of those verbs using an NP as second
argument. They are all direct transitive in English, and indirect transitive in French.1 2
We have taken a decision not to include French pronominal constructions with se _ when
they occurred for certain verbs_ in the database: thus se décider à (to decide) and s’échapper
de (to escape) are not listed in the data itself, as they present both syntactic and semantic
variations in relation to the core verbs from which they are formed. But we are
nevertheless going to investigate pronominal verbs briefly.

1

Translation of the English verbs into French can sometimes lead to different solutions.
For instance, to value can be translated both as évaluer (a directly transitive verb), and tenir
à, as we have used in our data; both translations here correspond to different meanings
of the verb. To enjoy knows at least four translations, depending on context; we have
retained jouir de for its indirect transitive construction. We opted for the translation of
authentic English utterances into French, rather than the direct use of authentic French
utterances different from the English ones, since this approach facilitates a comparative
study between the two languages.
2

We have already signalled in chapter 1 the difficulty of identifying arguments and nonarguments in relation to a predicate. While searching for utterances to illustrate the use of
our data verbs in their syntactic context, we arbitrarily followed the entries given in two
dictionaries, the Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary (1987) for the English verbs,
and Le Petit Robert - Dictionnaire de la Langue française (1995) for the French verbs, as
debating the participation of a phrase into a verb‟s a-structure is not our purpose here.
The reader may find however that he/she disagrees with the syntactic frames we have
retained to typify each item‟s a-structure, as they may appear incomplete. Why not allow
the verb renounce a V + DO + IO frame when one can say to renounce something for
something/someone ? Because our reference dictionary did not list that particular syntactic
frame for to renounce, thereby indicating that the argument for something/someone was to be
considered as periphery. Matters of lexicology are well beyond our scope here, and we
contented ourselves with V + DO constructions for English and V + IO constructions
for French, as this was sufficient (and simpler) for our study. But we duly note that the
matter is always ambiguous.
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4.3. Direct vs. indirect transitivity: the case of pronominal verbs

In many Romance languages, a particle traditionally classified as a pronoun, is used in
conjunction with certain verbs to highlight semantic characteristics of the process such as
reflexivity and reciprocity. In French, that particle takes the basic form se in the infinitive
and it is thought to act as object to the verb. But as it never appears with any preposition,
it is intriguing to consider whether se is a direct or an indirect object to its predicate.

4.3.1. Is se a direct or an indirect object ?
According to traditional grammar, French shows three types of pronominal verbs:
-

Reflexive verbs use their reflexive pronoun as direct object to the predicate. Since
it is impossible for a French verb to be ditransitive, we assume that any other
argument used by the predicate should be indirect.

-

Reciprocal verbs use their pronoun as indirect object; this relates to the animacy
of the participant represented as the se pronoun, which is also the participant
represented as the subject of the predicate. Those verbs can be followed by a
direct argument.

-

There are also non-referring se pronouns, often related to a middle or passive
meaning of the predicate. In those cases, pronominal and non-pronominal forms
of the predicate will differ in meaning, whereas reflexive and reciprocal uses of
the pronominal forms should retain the same meaning as the non-pronominal
forms from which they are derived.

This approach is very similar to those adopted by proponents of the syntax-semantics
interface in argument structure. It assumes that se is the syntactic means by which
semantic values such as reflexivity and reciprocity manifest themselves.
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Directly conflicting this state of affairs however, there is also the assumption that a
pronominal verb‟s transitivity status should be identical to that of its corresponding nonpronominal form. We shall see now in analysing the pronominal forms for our data
verbs, that this poses challenges.

All the following verbs in our database displayed reflexive value in at least one of their
pronominal forms:
(D3)

changer (to change)



(P3)

se changer
(to change one‟s clothes)

(D4)

décider (to decide)



(P4)

se décider pour + NP
(to decide for + NP)

(D8)

échapper (to escape)



(P8)

s‟échapper de/ par + LOC
(to escape from/through +LOC)

(D14) appuyer (to press)



(P14) s‟appuyer à/sur/contre + LOC
(to lean against/on/against+LOC)1

(D20) tenir (to hold)



(P20) se tenir à + NP
(to hold onto + NP)

In each case, the process described is similar in both the non-pronominal and the
pronominal forms. In the pronominal forms, the process affects primarily the participant
represented by the se pronoun: se takes on the status of direct object. As the subject of
the predicate also represents the same referent, it is a case of a participant, usually
animate, operating a process upon itself: this is reflexivity. Let us note that in four out of

S’appuyer à literally translates as „to press one‟s body against‟, so we should not be fooled by the translation
to lean on: both non-pronominal and pronominal forms of the verb refer to identical processes.
1
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five cases here, the predicate can also take a further argument1, which is introduced by a
preposition, and is therefore indirect.
However, we find among our data some verbs which, in their reflexive form, should
confer an indirect transitive status onto the se pronoun, with reference to their nonpronominal a-structure. They are:

(D2)

demander (to ask)

(D10) pardonner (to forgive)



(P2)



(P10) se pardonner (to forgive oneself)

se demander
(to ask oneself, to wonder)

As one can use a phrase such as se pardonner ses fautes (to forgive oneself one‟s own
mistakes), only (D10) pardonner may display use of a direct object in the pronominal form,
thereby confirming the necessarily indirect status of se. (D2) se demander must be
considered to use the se pronoun indirectly simply by virtue of meaning: since nonpronominal and pronominal predicates here refer to identical processes, i.e. the
relationships between the participants are of a similar nature, we must concede that, if
the object of all those processes is indirect in the non-pronominal form, then the object
in all pronominal forms must be indirect as well. Here semantic judgement overrides the
crude semantic-to-syntax links established by traditional grammar.

Let us see if the grammar rules are respected in relation to our verbs‟ reciprocal senses.
We find here that verbs relating to a communication process easily confer a reciprocal
meaning onto their pronominal form. They include:

1

In (P4) se décider pour + NP (to decide for + NP) and (P20) se tenir à + NP (to hold onto + NP), we
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(D1)

répondre (to answer, to reply) 

(P1)

se répondre
(to reply to one another)

(D9)

faxer (to fax)



(P9)

se faxer (to fax one another)

(D13) téléphoner (to phone)



(P13) se téléphoner
(to phone one another)

(D19) télégraphier (to telegraph)



(P19) se télégraphier
(to telegraph one another)

The se pronoun effectively is a shortcut for a process meaning „X answers Y and Y
answers X‟, „X faxes to Y and Y faxes to X‟, etc.
Other verbs in our data also take on reciprocal meaning in the pronominal form, as well
as a possible reflexive meaning. They include:

(D2)

demander (to ask)



(P2)

se demander (to ask one another)

for which we have already observed a reflexive meaning. We can add:
(D16) ressembler (to resemble)



(P16)

se ressembler
(to look like one another)

(D18) convenir (to suit)



(P18)

se convenir
(to suit one another)

There is no difficulty here in both participants, as represented by the subject and the se
pronoun, acting upon one another reciprocally. The fact that se should be interpreted as
an indirect object refers to the transitivity status of the non-pronominal forms, where the
second argument was systematically introduced by a preposition à (see appendix for
examples). This concurs with the „rule‟ established by traditional grammar: it stated that

are certainly dealing with predicative arguments; in the other cases, the locative phrases may be
considered as adjuncts. We will not settle this issue here.
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all se pronouns in a reciprocal process would be construed as indirect objects of the
predicate.
But we must highlight the ambiguity of se: we might wonder whether certain predicates
use it reciprocally or reflexively. We solve the conundrum by referring to the meaning of
the predicate once again, not by applying semantics-to-syntax rules in a blind manner.
(P22) se demander is one of those ambiguous verbs: one can only establish whether se is
reflexive (meaning „to ask oneself‟) or reciprocal (meaning „to ask each other‟) in context.
The reflexive sense often corresponds to a single participant, while the reciprocal sense
must apply to a plural use of the verb, with reference to several participants in the
process. Therefore traditional grammar appears incomplete in its account of pronominal
forms.

Our data even offers one example of the third type of pronominalisation, the nonreferring one. There is at least one verb here that shows neither reflexive, nor reciprocal
values in its pronominal form:

(D6)

douter (to doubt)



(P6)

se douter de + NP (to suspect)

As predicted by the rules, the pronominal meaning, although clearly related, differs from
the non-pronominal one. Se is said to be an intrinsic pronoun, specific to that new
meaning; it is not in itself a referring object pronoun.

A number of verbs in our database did not even fit into any of the three pronominal
categories; in fact, the following verbs do not pronominalise at all:

(D5)

divorcer (to divorce)

56

(D7)

jouir (to enjoy)

(D11) partir (to leave)
(D12) obéir (to obey)
(D15) renoncer (to renounce)
(D17) résister (to resist)

Concerning reflexivity, it can easily be shown that at least five of those verbs, (D5)divorcer,
(D7) jouir, (D12) obéir, (D15) renoncer and (D17) résister, actually refer to processes that
necessarily take place between at least two participants: logically, they cannot reflexivise.
And a conflictual connotation applies to all those verbs except (D7) jouir.
Even (D11) partir implies the physical separation of both subject and object participants,
which potentially blocks any interaction between the two. This could explain why
reciprocity seems inapplicable here. This is not entirely true however; reciprocity is
possible for at least four of those verbs by means of the phrase „l’un [PREP] l’autre’
([PREP] each other). One can use the following in French:

(P5)

divorcer l‟un de l‟autre (to divorce one another)

(P12) obéir l‟un à l‟autre (to obey each other)
(P15) renoncer l‟un à l‟autre (to renounce each other)
(P17) résister l‟un à l‟autre (to resist one another)

The use of a preposition à or de in all those cases clearly confirms that the arguments
involved in the reciprocal process are indeed indirect. We could add at this point,
although the case did not appear in our data analysis, that reflexivity is not the preserve
of the se particle either. Some verbs use the phrase ‘[PREP] soi-même’ ([PREP] oneself) to
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mark that particular value, as in ‘douter de soi-même’ (to doubt oneself). If it is not the only
marker for reflexivity or reciprocity, we may wonder what exactly is the value of the socalled se pronoun. Looking at non-referring pronominal verbs, we may wonder if it is a
pronoun at all.

4.3.2. Grimshaw: a lexical approach
In an article published in 1982, Grimshaw thinks that se is not a pronoun at all, but a
marker left on predicates by the operations of inchoativisation, reflexivisation and middle
verb formation. It is in short a lexical marker. Grimshaw hails from the same school as
Pinker and Levin. Working at the level of logical structure (LF), she seeks to associate
lexical rules with (generative) grammatical forms. In her view, it is lexical rules that
trigger the assignment of grammatical functions onto certain arguments.
As she re-investigates traditional accounts of pronominalisation in Romance languages,
Grimshaw manages to accommodate the three categories of pronominal verbs with three
lexical rules. Non-referring pronominal forms are often the result of a process of
inchoativisation of the verb; for instance, in the following transformation, the first
example is in a causative form, and the second one is its inchoative counterpart:

(4.1)



Pierrre casse le
verre
Pierre breaks the
glass
„Pierre breaks the glass‟

(4.2)

Le
verre se casse
The glass breaks
„The glass breaks‟

Alternatively, it is also assumed that se in Romance languages introduces what in English
we term „middle verbs‟. Grimshaw establishes „the Middle Rule‟ to account for those
forms. However, since se does not refer to any participant here, it is doubtful whether it
should be conferred pronominal status at all.
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In the present study, we are more concerned with reflexive and reciprocal forms in which
se looks like an argument of the verb. Grimshaw establishes one rule called
Reflexivisation, to account for both phenomena. She equates reciprocity to a plural form
of reflexivity. This assimilation is debatable however as we have already explained that
many plural pronominal forms presented both reflexive and reciprocal interpretations.
That said, Grimshaw‟s approach is convincing as it solves two enigmas at once: we now
know that non-referring se is not necessarily a pronoun; and we need not concern
ourselves with the direct/indirect issue anymore, since neither reflexive nor reciprocal se
forms were ever arguments of the predicate.
In this theory, se is the marker left after the a-structure of the non-pronominal form of
the verb has been manipulated. Grimshaw sees two types of manipulations at work: in
non-referring se, an argument has been removed, as in our examples of inchoativisation

(4.1)



Pierrre casse le
verre
Pierre breaks the
glass
„Pierre breaks the glass‟

(4.2)

Le
verre se casse
The glass breaks
„The glass breaks‟

In reflexive and reciprocal forms, se is the marker left to indicate the binding of an
internal argument (an object) onto the external argument of the predicate (the subject).
We already knew that subject and se particle both referred to the same participant in
reflexive constructions; what happens in this account, is that the predicate‟s direct object
is bound onto its external argument. It also seems that in reciprocal structures, an
indirect object is bound onto the subject slot.
This is a process of detransitivisation, whereby a predicate actually reduces its valency by
losing one argument. This phenomenon is restricted to verbs of valency 2 or more:
where a verb initially had only one internal argument, the loss of that argument
effectively means that its corresponding se form will be intransitive; verbs of a higher
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valency can retain other internal arguments along with their new se marker. The hierarchy
of the arguments will be reorganised; for instance, in reflexive a-structures, former
indirect objects can be promoted to direct objecthood if they fill the slot vacated by the
argument now bound onto the se marker.

This rapid tour of the vast issue of pronominalisation sought out to answer one simple
question: how does one recognise a direct from an indirect object ? The absence of any
preposition with se singled out pronominal verbs as prime candidates for a preliminary
investigation. Notwithstanding the doubtful pronominal status of se itself, we observed
some interesting facts relating to the domain of transitivity. We saw that traditional
approaches, very similar to those adopted by proponents of the syntax-semantics
interface in argument structure, were incomplete. Se was seen as the syntactic means by
which semantic values such as reflexivity and reciprocity were to manifest themselves.
But since it had the same transitivity status as the argument it stood for (it was
sometimes a DO and sometimes an IO), the linking rules established between those
values and the syntactic structures we call pronominal, were not absolutely consistent.
On the other hand, Grimshaw‟s account was representative of the lexical semantics
school of thought: verbs only pronominalised because they followed lexical rules that
were ingrained in their lexical make-up.
Both approaches point in the same direction however. Firstly, broad linking rules let
through a number of individual cases: we must pay more attention to the individual
characteristics of our data verbs. Secondly, the determination of a verb‟s transitivity
status is closely related to its semantic values, whether those are included in that
predicate‟s l-entry or part of a distinct network. We now need to learn more about the
semanticity of our data verbs.
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Chapter 5: The choice of à and de with indirect transitive
arguments: a semantic basis for the French prepositional system
How can we determine which semantic values associate with individual predicates ?
Since we know after Gawron, that indirect verbs select prepositions whose semanticity
somehow reflects their own, we shall investigate the nature of the prepositions which
accompany our French verbs. Cognitive approaches to prepositions, as seen in our
chapter 3, should assist us in this task. We hope that by shedding light onto the process
used by French predicates in selecting a preposition, we will be able to determine what
undermines the direct vs. indirect dichotomy. All the verbs in our data appear with either
à or de. We will therefore concentrate on those two prepositions.

5.1. Proposal for a semantically motivated system for the determination of
prepositions with indirect transitive arguments in French

5.1.1. Examples of verbs using the preposition ‘à’ to introduce an indirect object
In our selection of examples, the most prominent and consistent group contains verbs of
communication such as (D2) demander „to ask‟, (D1) répondre „to answer‟ and
(D13) téléphoner „to phone‟. Invariably, the communication processes described here entail
the participation of a recipient for the message. Invariably in French, that recipient is an
argument of the verb introduced by the preposition à .
(D2b) “Combien de langues
parlez- vous ?”
How many languages
speak you(SG)
„ How many languages do you speak ?
demanda-t-il à
la
asked
he to
the
he asked the young girl‟

jeune
young
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fille
girl

(D1d) Réponds
à
ton
Answer
to
your
„Answer your father !‟

père !
father

(D13b) Je
suis
retourné
à l‟
hôtel pour téléphoner à Jenny
I
PAST went back
to the hotel to
phone
to Jenny
„I went back to the hotel to phone Jenny‟
In (D2b), the communication verb demanda „asked‟ has two arguments: an external
argument il „he‟ acting as its subject, and an internal argument la jeune fille „the young girl‟
introduced by the preposition à; that makes it an indirect object. A la jeune fille „to the
young girl‟ refers to the recipient of the message sent through the predicate demander „to
ask‟. In (D1d) the verb réponds „answer‟ in the imperative form only has one argument,
the indirect object à ton père „(to) your father‟, which also represents the potential recipient
of the answer. In (D13b), although the communication verb téléphoner „to phone‟ is part
of an infinitival clause, it still has one internal argument, introduced by the preposition à
and posing as the recipient of the phone call.

- Animacy
There are really three types of communication verbs in our selection: the basic verbs of
communication like (D2) demander „to ask‟ and (D1) répondre „to answer‟; the verbs of
communication using a technical device such as (D9) faxer „to fax‟, (D19) télégraphier „to
telegraph‟ and (D13) téléphoner „to phone‟; and the ex-verbs of communication (verbs that
originally referred to verbal processes, but have evolved towards other meanings): those
are (D10) pardonner „to forgive‟, (D12) obéir/désobéir „to obey/to disobey‟ and (D15) renoncer
„to renounce‟.

(D9f) Elle a
faxé la
mauvaise
She PAST faxed the
bad
„She faxed the bad news to her brother‟
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nouvelle
news

à son frère
to her brother

(D19d) Il
avait oublié
de
télégraphier
He
had
forgotten
to
telegraph
„He had forgotten to telegraph the widow‟

à
to

(D10d) Ils
avaient
pardonné
They had
forgiven
„They had forgiven their host‟

hôte
host

à
to

leur
their

la
the

veuve
widow

All of those verbs have, as part of their a-structure, an argument introduced by the
preposition à. That recipient must be capable of comprehension towards the message it
is being sent; therefore it is no surprise to find out that à introduces an animate
participant. There are two notable exceptions however.
(D12d) Il
ne
leur
It
NEG to them
„It never occurred to them

est
jamais
PAST never

qu‟
ils
pouvaient
désobéir
that
they could
disobey
that they could disobey their parents‟

venu à l‟esprit
occurred
à
to

(D12b) Les
troupes rechignaient à
obéir aux
The troops were reluctant to
obey to the
„The troops were reluctant to obey orders‟

leurs
their

parents
parents

ordres
orders

The predicates (D12) obéir „to obey‟ and (D12) désobéir „to disobey‟ do not see a recipient
in their indirect objects à leurs parents „(to) their parents‟ and aux ordres „(to the) orders‟;
those arguments in fact represent the senders of the message. In this case the recipients
ils „they‟ and les troupes „the troops‟ actually take on the roles of subject. By virtue of the
principle of foregrounding/ saliency/ prominence we know to be operating at the basis
of the ordering of arguments, we must assume that those particular predicates emphasise
how a message is received, rather than how it is sent.
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If we are to follow cognitive beliefs on semantics, we should soon find certain extended
meanings of the „animacy‟ value. By extended, cognitive linguists mean that concrete
notions such as animacy _ which is based here on an observable quality, the autonomy of
movement of the recipient _ can be applied to participants that our senses would not
normally perceive as prime candidates for that particular value.
(D15b) Nous avons renoncé
à
l‟
We
have renounced
to
the
„We have renounced the use of force

usage de
use
of

la
the

force
force

pour régler notre différend
to
settle our
dispute
to settle our dispute‟
In (D12b) and (D15b), the indirect object introduced by the preposition à1 is inanimate.
It can be argued that in (D12b), the orders represent an act of speech carried out by an
animate entity, and that the argument aux ordres „(to the) orders‟ is therefore a
metaphorical extension of the principle of animacy. But the verb (D15) renoncer „to
renounce‟ only allows one inanimate (and indirect) argument. It is a paradox of its
etymological evolution that the latinate renuntiare, meaning „to state as a response‟, shifted
from being a pure predicate of verbal communication, to being a psych-verb referring to
a mental, even emotional, process. However, as the nature of its argument changed from
animate recipient to inanimate theme, the preposition à survived. Nowadays it looks
more like an archaism than a truly motivated marker.

1

In example (D15b), the preposition à is contracted with the definite article les to form the word aux.
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- Distance
Other verbs using the preposition à to introduce their second argument include
(D8) échapper „to escape‟ and (D17) résister „to resist‟. Both allow animate as well as
inanimate participants in the indirect argument-slot.
(D8d) Et
il y a
un
détail d‟
importance
And there is a
point of
importance
„And there is a major point that seems to

qui
that

semble
seems to

avoir échappé
au
capitaine Imrie
have escaped
to the Captain Imrie
have escaped Captain Imrie‟
(D17d) Ils
ont
essayé de
résister
They PAST tried to
resist
„They tried to resist the robbers‟

aux
voleurs
to the robbers

In examples (D8d) and (D17d), the indirect objects refer to people. Therefore animacy
may again be motivating the choice of preposition à before the second argument. But
strangely both predicates (D8) échapper „to escape‟ and (D17) résister „to resist‟ have
negative connotations. There is tension between the first argument initiating the process,
and the second argument at the receiving end. The former seems to be under attack; it
must adopt a defensive strategy: resisting or running away. This amounts to creating
either physical or mental space between itself and the other participant. It is the notion of
distance that dominates those processes.
(D8b) Je doute que de telles tactiques échappent
I doubt that such
tactics
escape
„I doubt that such tactics escape their notice‟

à
to

leur
their

attention
notice

(D17b) Notre syndicat a
résisté à l‟ introduction de l‟ automatisation
Our union
PAST resisted to the introduction of the automation
„Our union resisted the introduction of automation‟
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In (D8b) and (D17b), even inanimate participants like attention span and progress, are
construed as aggressors from which the first arguments tactics and union must protect
themselves. This implies that the internal argument must be equipped with a certain
amount of volition and agentiveness, as if it were animate. Effectively, both arguments
à leur attention „(to) their notice‟, and à l’introduction de l’automatisation „(to) the introduction
of automation‟ are the results of human action. So the value of distance can also benefit
from an extension of animacy.

Another instance of extended meaning in our selection can be seen in the phrase
(D20) tenir à „to hold dear‟. This use is clearly derived from the basic sense of the verb
tenir „to hold‟. Whereas tenir involves physical contact between the subject and the object,
(D20) tenir à refers to an emotional process.
(D20b) Lorsqu‟ ils
atteignent cet âge, ils tiennent à leur indépendance
When they reach
that age, they value
to their independence
„When they reach that age, they value their independence‟

The derivation is easy to trace: what one likes, one wishes to hold. In this instance then, à
underlines the distance between first and second argument: physical contact is
impossible, but the emotional bond remains.

Distance could be the core value of à in all our examples so far: for all verbs of
communication, there is a distance between the sender and the recipient of the message,
especially where technical support is used; and where tension prevails between the
subject and object of the verb, a distance, maybe psychological, separates both
participants; this may even involve the desire to create distance physically between them,
as with the verb (D8) échapper „to escape‟. This dynamic process must somehow be
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controlled, and it is only logical that it should be under the control of an agentive, and
volitional, participant. It is even easier if that participant is also animate. In most cases,
the participant that determines distance between the external and internal arguments, is
the internal argument itself, hence its marking by the preposition à. But occasionally, we
have seen that the principle of saliency may reverse this trend as with (D12) obéir/désobéir
„to obey/to disobey‟: those twin predicates retain the preposition à, even though the
volitional participant is expressed as the first argument; à still acts as a marker of distance
(and possible tension) between the participants however.

Can distance explain the use of à with verbs as diverse as (D16) ressembler „to resemble‟
and (D18) convenir „to suit‟ ?
(D16d) Votre père et
vous lui1
ressemblez
Your father and
you
to him resemble
„Both you and your father resemble him

tous les deux
both

beaucoup
physiquement.
a lot
physically
very much physically‟
(D16b) La
situation
ressemble
à celle de l‟
Europe
The situation
resembles
to that of the Europe
„The situation resembles that of Europe in 1940‟

en 1940
in 1940

Whether the indirect object is animate as in (D16d) or inanimate as in (D16b), the value
of distance can be invoked to explain in both cases the use of the preposition à. It is
necessary for the participants lui „(to) him‟ and celle de „that of‟ to mark a distinction
between them and the subject participants, or total identification might take place. The
predicate (D16) ressembler „to resemble‟ automatically marks its second argument with à to
emphasise that distinction.
1

Lui is an object pronoun that contains reference both to the object him and to its indirect status.
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(D18b)Vous devriez
faire comme
You should
do
as
„You should do what the doctor thinks
qu‟
il
conviendra
le mieux
that
it
will suit
the best
will suit you and your baby best‟

le
the

docteur
doctor

pense
thinks

à vous et
à votre bébé
to you and to your baby

Finally, we can also relate the use of à with the verb (D18) convenir „to suit‟ to its core
value of distance. Convenir comes from the latin „con venire‟, „come together‟. It originally
referred to a process of moving with a purpose to reduce the distance between the
participants involved. That alone explains adequately its presence with the modern form
convenir; although the meaning of the predicate has evolved, its a-structure has retained
the preposition à.

We have been able to justify all uses of the preposition à in our selection of verbs
through a single core value. Can we do the same now for preposition de ?

5.1.2. Examples of verbs using the preposition de to introduce an indirect object

- Locative de
In our selection, only two verbs use prepositions with a locative sense. (D14) appuyer
„to press‟ can use the prepositions à, sur and contre, and (D11) partir „to leave‟ requires the
preposition de.

(D14b) Le
jeune homme
appuya
The young man
pressed
„The young man pressed a button‟
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sur
on

un
a

bouton
button

(D11b) Mon train part de
Euston
My
train leaves from Euston
„My train leaves Euston at 11.30‟

à
at

11 h 30
11.30

De is originally a locative preposition. It marks a reference point, and the predicate it
appears with, describes movement away from that point.

- The ‘separation’ value
But de mainly appears in our selection with non-motion verbs such as (D5) divorcer
„to divorce‟.
(D5b) Si elle veut
divorcer de lui, elle a toute ma sympathie
If she wants to divorce from him, she has all
my sympathy
„If she wants to divorce him, she has my sympathy‟
The participant introduced by de is necessarily animate with this predicate. Why was de
selected in this instance ? Which specific semantic value does it offer ? As with
(D11) partir „to leave‟, it must involve movement away from the participant introduced by
de: to divorce someone implies to move away from that person; it also means severing
ties.
Let us look at other verbs that also use the preposition de.
(D4b) Le
but
de
Charlton a
The goal of
Charlton PAST
„Charlton‟s goal decided the match‟
(D3d) Il
a
changé
He
PAST changed
„He changed job‟

d‟
of

emploi
job
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décidé
decided

du
match
of the match

Neither (D4) décider „to decide‟ nor (D3) changer „to change‟ are verbs of movement.
However, both imply a change in situation for the participants of the process, a
separation of past and present. We can illustrate that sense more clearly by taking a closer
look at (D3) changer „to change‟:

(D3b) J‟
ai
changé
I
PAST changed
„I changed the bulb‟

l‟
the

ampoule
bulb

It is possible to use the verb (D3) changer „to change‟ with a direct object, as well as an
indirect one. The difference in meaning is not immediately obvious; both constructions
mean „to change‟. But where a DO construction applies to the manipulation of the
participant construed as the object, the IO construction applies to more serious events
such as changing job, house, opinion … and even clothes (changer d’appartement „to change
flat‟, changer d’avis „to change opinion‟, changer de chemise „to change shirt‟). Those events
have wider implications for the subject of the process, such as physical movement; they
often refer to non-reversible situations, with a „before‟ and an „after‟ being clearly
delineated.
With all three verbs (D5) divorcer „to divorce‟, (D3) changer „to change‟ and (D4) décider „to
decide‟, we are faced with a sense of breaking away from the past to start things anew.
Divorcing, changing things and making decisions all involve a value of „separation‟.

- Non-volitional participant
In all three instances, it is also the case that the participant which appears as the internal
argument and is introduced by de, is not involved in the process at all. With a verb such
as (D5) divorcer „to divorce‟, it is the participant represented as the subject who initiates
the process; the second participant, even though animate, seems to have no bearing on
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what is taking place. Incidentally, in French, where a divorce is consensual, both
participants take the subject slot conjointly as in Pat et Marie divorcent „Pat and Marie are
getting a divorce‟.
In (D4b) Le but de Charlton a décidé du match „Charlton‟s goal decided the match‟, the match
may be the participant primarily affected by the decision process, but it is inanimate and
absolutely uninvolved in the event as it is also non-agentive.
And the job in (D3d) Il a changé d’emploi „He changed job‟ is equally non-agentive, so that
we are now a far cry from the participants encountered with the preposition à. Basically,
we had found the latter to be volitional. There is no such value in the participants
introduced by de. Rather it is non-volitionality that appears to be a requirement here.

(D6d) Pourquoi
devrais- je
Why
should I
„Why should I doubt him ?‟

douter
doubt

de
of

lui ?
him ?

(D6b) Certains de nos membres doutent de l‟ efficacité des
manifestations
Some
of our members doubt of the value
of the demonstrations
„Some of our members doubt the value of demonstrations‟
(D7b) Ils
jouissent d‟ un
niveau
They enjoy
of a
standard
„They enjoy exceptional standards of living‟

de
of

vie
exceptionnel
living exceptional

The verbs (D6) douter „to doubt‟ and (D7) jouir „to enjoy‟ also require indirect objects with
the preposition de. They are not verbs of movement, and it is difficult to construe them
as involving the value „separation‟. Whereas (D6) douter „to doubt‟ uses both animate and
non-animate objects, (D7) jouir „to enjoy‟ only wants an inanimate participant as its
internal argument. Inanimate objects are generally deprived of volitionality. But what of
an animate object such as lui „(to) him‟ in (D6d)Pourquoi devrais-je douter de lui ? ‘Why
should I doubt him ?‟ It is not the first time we have encountered a human participant
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with the preposition de. In (D5b) Si elle veut divorcer de lui, elle a toute ma sympathie „If she
wants to divorce him, she has my sympathy‟, we had already remarked on the absence of
involvement on the part of the participant expressed as the indirect object. It seems that
we are faced with a similar situation in (D6d), with the second argument lui „(to) him‟
taking no part in the process. In fact, the predicate (D6) douter „to doubt‟ demands that its
human subject express a judgement on its object. Being a psychological process, rather
than a physical one, it relies entirely on its first participant. The object, be it even a
human one, has little choice but to remain passive.

- Passive value
We cannot but note at this point how the preposition de coincidentally appears in passive
constructions in French. Whereas the prototypical preposition in French passive
sentences is par „by‟, used to introduce the agent of the process as the internal argument
of the verb, there also exists the possibility of substituting de with certain types of
predicates.

(5.1) Le
camion
était conduit
The
lorry
was
driven
„A woman was driving the lorry‟
(5.2) Il
est
aimé de
He
is
loved of
„All his friends love him‟

tous
all

par
by

ses
his

une
a

femme
woman

amis
friends

In the first example the verb conduire „to drive‟ is an active process, involving movement
and an agent marked here by the preposition par „by‟. But in the second example, the
verb aimer „to love‟ describes an emotional process, without any active or agentive value.
Therefore de can be selected to introduce the second participant, which is in no case an
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agent. On the contrary, neither agency nor volition is needed with a psych-verb such as
aimer.

As we have now established a consistent set of semantic values for both prepositions de
and à, we can summarise our findings and investigate their cognitive basis.

5.2. Links to cognitive theories

Some cognitive linguists assume that the different semantic values of a preposition are all
derived from a primitive locative sense. Can we convincingly establish such a pattern for
both à and de ?

5.2.1. ‘A’: from dot to distance
According to Vandeloise (1991), there are two core values to the preposition à. The first
one, as we saw earlier in chapter 3, is locative: à appears before a landmark, construed as
distant, therefore unidimensional. A visual representation of this sense would be a simple
dot, standing for an object without any defined shape or contours because of its distance
from the viewer. As well as pointing towards this landmark, à carries a strong sense of a
path leading towards it, according to Vandeloise.
The second value is what Vandeloise terms „routine à‟: a conventionalised use of that
preposition, wherever a preposition is needed. This prototypical value would be devoid
of meaning.

Both values actually confirm our line of reasoning here. Starting as a locative preposition,
as all prepositions do in cognitive theories, à originally pointed to a distant location,
without any particular physical features. The recipient in a process of communication,
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often amounted to a location towards which the message was sent. So all recipients
became à-marked internal arguments in the a-structures of verbs of communication.
Those recipients were generally animate, and logically capable of volition and animacy
(they could use those qualities to reply to the message they had received for instance), so
that any participant accompanied by the preposition à automatically became endowed
with those potential values. And the channel of communication could be identified with
the „path‟ value of à. Once a path was established between the sender and the recipient,
there was always the potential for that path to be used to reduce (or increase) the
distance between the two participants of the communication process. That is how the
„distance‟ value also became entwined with any further use of à. In fact, „distance‟
provided the motivation for all further uses of à, and we have seen that it underlines such
diverse uses as (D17) résister à „to resist‟ and (D16) ressembler à „to resemble‟.

It may also be that the prototypical use of à developed because this was a rather neutral
preposition, immune to the traditional locative values of shape, size, dimension, etc.
Therefore it would mark just about any type of participant. It might not be so much the
intrinsic values of à that determine its frequent use to introduce indirect objects, as the
very principle that determines the use of prepositional markers.
Here we must refer back to what we have learnt about transitivity in general.
If a predicate expresses a process of „carry-over‟ or „transfer‟ between two participants
and if transitivity assesses the quality of that process, a direct object used as second
argument would reflect a successful process, whereas an indirect object would signal an
unsatisfactory transfer. In the case of à introducing the indirect object, we can speculate
that its presence emphasises just that: a faulty process. It is not so much the value of the
preposition, as its mere presence that is revealing.
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But we could also equally assume that the values of „distance‟ and „path‟ inherent to à, are
after all relevant to the nature of the fault involved. In that case, the „carry-over‟ would
be affected by certain characteristics of the internal argument; those characteristics, as
signalled by the presence of à, could include volition, animacy and agentiveness, or in
more general terms, a willingness on the part of the object to put a distance between
itself and the subject controlling the predicate.
This second hypothesis entails that the nature of the preposition selected by the object
reveals much about the process taking place. Let us try and verify this hypothesis with an
analysis of the preposition de.

5.2.2. ‘De’: from landmark to non-volitionality
We have unequivocally established from the beginning that de is originally a locative
preposition that refers to a landmark. Any process involving the use of de in a locative
sense, involves movement away from that landmark. That primitive sense could be seen
in the verbal construct (D11) partir de „to leave‟.
We then established that an extended meaning of this locative sense, would involve a
notion of separation between the subject and the object of a predicate. This happened
with verbal phrases such as (D15) divorcer de „to divorce‟, (D3) changer de „to change‟ and
(D4) décider de „to decide‟. The separation could be physical as well as psychological; it
could apply to animate and inanimate objects; and in every case, the process was firmly
directed by the subject, with the object appearing to dispel any active involvement.
Finally, we saw with verbs such as (D6) douter „to doubt‟ and (D7) jouir „to enjoy‟ that the
notion of an uninvolved object, devoid of any agency or volitionality, could also be
expressed by the preposition de. This sense is again a direct extension of the previous
one, so that we have now established a sliding scale of semantic values for the
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preposition de, starting from its primitive locative meaning and gradually moving away
towards more abstract uses.

This evolution from concrete locative sense towards a more abstract meaning is typical
of the way prepositions in general are conceptualised in the area of cognitive linguistics.
The relationships between the different values of a given preposition are either explained
as a continuous derivation from one meaning to the next, as seems to be the case with de,
or as a more complex network of interrelated meanings, sometimes radiating from a
common core; this is rather the case with à.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions

6.1. In favour of a more lexical approach

Syntax, semantics and the lexicon are all part of the determination of argument structure,
therefore they are all part of the determination of transitivity as well. We saw in chapter 2
that some linguists were seeking to explain the whole area of argument structure by
linking exclusively the two domains of semantics and syntax. Although this approach is
supported in cognitive terms by researchers such as Langacker, neither Van Valin and
LaPolla, nor Hopper and Thompson, nor Givón managed to construct a linking theory
large enough to encompass all cases of argument structure. It quickly became apparent
through more recent research presented in chapter 3, that the lexicon also had an
important part to play in the process. Linguists such as Pinker, Levin, Wechsler and
Gawron all acknowledged its role in various proportions. In this, they were at one with
cognitivists like Lakoff, Lindner and Vandeloise who saw the semantic properties of
individual words as the source of their use in discourse. Data analyses in chapters 4 and 5
allowed us to examine verbs that presented interlingual differences of transitivity
between English and French. Firstly, we asked whether one could distinguish a direct
from an indirect object in the absence of any obvious lexical marker such as a
preposition. An overlook of the issue of pronominal verbs in French showed us that
rules in the style of the syntax-semantics interface, such as those purported by traditional
grammar, were not completely satisfactory; here again, the issue of lexically-based
semanticity, as advocated by Grimshaw, seemed a likely recourse to explain how the
meaning of a verb could determine the transitivity status of its internal arguments. We
then took a closer look at the prepositions selected by our data verbs, with the hope of
establishing the guidelines that determine such choices, and furthermore, the very
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reasoning that would justify the choice of direct vs. indirect transitivity for all predicates
concerned. We succeeded in uncovering a consistent system that could form the basis of
the selection process for prepositions such as à and de. Moreover, that system could be
rooted in well-established cognitive views about prepositions. We also determined that
the very motivation for the use of a preposition before a second argument was to
underline a type of impediment to the process of carry-over expressed by a transitive
structure.

Throughout this research, the three domains of syntax, semantics and the lexicon have
recurred over and over again. How exactly do they interact in the determination process
of a predicate‟s transitivity status ? And what is the place of the lexicon in this triangle ?
In order to understand the principles at work when the argument structure of a
predicate is being determined, we can ask about the most basic process of argument
structure determination: that of a child‟s initial acquisition of a-structure. Pinker
investigated that very process when he tried to explain Baker‟s paradox, or how we
acquire the correct a-structures for verbs when we are seldom exposed to negative
evidence. There are two possible answers to that question.
The first answer considers all data individually, and establishes a lexicon in the child‟s
mind. Every predicate is given its own entry, including details relating to its a-structure,
as heard from evidence. Every time that predicate is heard again, new data is recorded
into its lexical entry, such as the possibility of other a-structures. In this hypothesis, the
determination of argument structure is an exercise in recalling a-structures from the
predicate‟s lexical entry each time we wish to use it. Consequently every single argument
would have its own linking rule, and the linking rules would work directly between the
lexicon and syntax.
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The second hypothesis uses semantics as an intermediate between syntax and the lexicon.
Each time a predicate is heard in the context of an utterance, its semantic components
are analysed and the predicate is filed under a semantic heading, for instance verb of state
or verb of communication. Each verbal semantic category triggers its own linking rules to
certain syntactic patterns; for example, verbs of communication link to double object
a-structures in English. In this account, the question of how semantics and syntax
actually interface is completely relevant.
However, as demonstrated by our analysis of pronominal verbs in chapter 4, no linking
rules can establish alone how a status of direct or indirect transitivity can be conferred
upon every argument. We always knew that the lexicon had a part in the determination
of argument structure as a whole, so how does it affect the verbs in our selection
specifically ?

In Learnability and Cognition: the Acquisition of Argument Structure (1989), Pinker managed to
reconcile both hypotheses in a way that may interest us particularly in this context. He
assumes that a-structure acquisition takes place, as in the first hypothesis, through a
purely lexical process of filing lexical entries for individual predicates (we saw in our
second chapter that the a-structures were always part of a verb‟s entry in Pinker‟s theory).
However we cannot deny that certain semantic categories relating to participants
coincide astonishingly with established syntactic patterns. 1

11

Pinker reminds us that people such as Perlmutter (1978) and Rosen (1984), to which
we shall add Givón (1984; 1990), have observed how types of verbs across languages, are
linked to identical syntactic structures: for instance „verbs of voluntary action, manner of
speaking, and some involuntary bodily processes are unergative, and verbs of being in
states, changing state, and changing existence are unaccusative (Perlmutter, 1978)‟
(p.225). More cross-linguistic evidence comes from Dryer (1986) who „reviews a diverse
sample of languages with ditransitive constructions and notes that the second object is
notionally a “patient/theme”, generally nonhuman, in the context of a first object that is
a “goal/beneficiary”, generally human (pp.94-95).
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Pinker thinks that such broad categories are really formed in the mind after initial
acquisition. That is to say that once a predicate has found its place in the child‟s lexicon,
it is then reassessed in order to find among its semantic components, some features
which it might share with other predicates. As the child acquires more vocabulary,
categories are formed that link together predicates with common semantic features. Thus
the lexicon and the semantic categories start coexisting and sharing information.
The next step must now link them to syntax. It is likely that children first rely exclusively
on the lexical entries of verbs, giving weight to the first hypothesis. But as their
vocabulary expands, they start using the semantic categories as a shortcut to determine a
verb‟s argument structure. This implies that links are finally established directly between
the semantic level and the syntactic level of argument structure: the notion of an
interface is relevant after all. As adults, we probably rely heavily on those shortcuts, as
they spare our memory patterns. So argument structure is determined individually for
each predicate in the relationship that links the lexicon directly to syntax; this relationship
is made of numerous linking rules between participants and argument-slots. An
intermediate level of semantics, based on the generalisation of such rules into broad
categories, can act as a shortcut to the determination of a-structure.

In this view then, it must be assumed that, as with any attempt at generalisation, some
elements do not fit the pattern. Whereas determination of argument structure may be
done through the means of semantic classes, as has been observed frequently among
languages of the world, some predicates remain impervious to classifications and can
only be apprehended through the basic process of lexicon-to-syntax linking. It is likely
that our data targeted such verbs that, through reasons of etymology mainly, did not
follow the prototypical patterns. That is probably the very reason why they came to our
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attention at all. Had they fitted into prototypical semantic classes, their a-structures
would have been smoothly determined. But the very fact that two different processes
seemed to be used in English and in French, highlighted discrepancies in the theory of a
universal syntax-to-semantics interface.

6.2. Questioning the universal / language-specific divide

We should now reflect on the issue of universality in the determination process of
argument structures. All theories of the syntax-semantics interface intrinsically assume
that the semantic values used in that process are universal. All languages would have a
sense of the human vs. the non-human, the animate vs. the inanimate, the agentive vs.
the passive, etc. Those would form universal semantic categories, probably based on the
universal human experience that is the cognitive perception of our environment. Such
general classification form the basis of all areas of cognitive linguistics: energy
transmission and movement as invoked by Langacker, or figures and grounds, paths and
directions as used by Lakoff, Lindner and Vandeloise among many other linguists, are
unquestionably universal in the minds of those who employ such concepts. Therefore, in
the process of determination of transitivity, all human beings would analyse the world
into identical semantic categories, according to a common cognitive basis, but every
language would find its own way of expressing those values through specific syntactic
patterns. In a nutshell, in the syntax-semantics interface, the semantics are universal but
the syntax is language-specific. Here the cut-off point between universality and languagespecificity is the linking process itself.

However our data analysis in this work somehow contradicts this simple assumption. We
looked at verbs of similar meaning that adopted different syntactic patterns in two given
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languages. If we were to pursue the point of view of the syntax-semantics interface to its
logical conclusion, we should have found systematic correspondences between English
and French in accounting for the semantic values of the participants of each process. For
example, where French expressed the value of non-volitionality of the second argument
by the means of the preposition de, English would have systematically used its own
syntactic device to signal non-volitionality. Instead the English language did not display
any marker; nor did it use any specific markers for animacy, agentiveness, distance, etc. in
our selection. There existed no systematic translation blueprints of those values between
the two languages. The only possible explanation for this state of affairs is that English
did not, at least for the verbs we selected, take any notice of those semantic values;
therefore it did not need to mark them. This means that English did not apply the same
semantic analysis to our verbs as French did. Effectively, both languages had their
specific semantic approaches. This clearly implies that language-specificity may start
earlier than the theories of the syntax-semantics interface would have us believe.

In order to test this hypothesis, we need to have a look at English prepositions. Let us
select some English verbs that have a preposition as part of their argument structure.
They are indirectly transitive. We shall also give their equivalent in French, which in
every case is directly transitive. In effect, we will attempt the same exercise as in chapter
5 but in reverse: we are now looking at verbs of indirect transitive behaviour in English,
but direct transitive behaviour in French, in order to apprehend the semantic system that
underpins English prepositions.

(6.1a) to approve of/to disapprove of

(6.1b) approuver/ désapprouver

(6.2a) to ask for

(6.2b) demander

(6.3a) to hope for

(6.3b) espérer
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(6.4a) to look at

(6.4b) regarder

(6.5a) to look for

(6.5b) chercher

(6.6a) to pay for

(6.6b) payer

(6.7a) to smell of

(6.7b) sentir

(6.8a) to wait for

(6.8b) attendre

In every case, those predicates can be followed immediately by a noun phrase.

Three different prepositions appear in this selection. We must find each one‟s core value.
It is immediately apparent that at in (6.4a) to look at has a spatial value. It introduces the
eye‟s target, which must be somewhat distant from the subject-onlooker. This value is
reminiscent of French à, although the distance between the first and the second
participant of the process need not be so great in English. The object observed can also
have a variety of shapes and sizes; it is not restricted to a mere dot, as it was in French.
The preposition for is the most used in this selection. In every case, it is consistent with a
prospective value. To ask, to hope, to look, to pay and to wait are all imbued with a sense of
expectation, a movement towards the future. We must remark that prospectiveness is
notably absent from any of their French counterparts, except maybe for (6.3b) espérer „to
hope‟. The latter is not marked in any way however, its prospective value being part of
the meaning of the verb itself rather. Whereas the English verbs all focus on the gains to
be had from the processes they describe, their equivalents in French focus matter-offactly on the processes themselves. Secondly, it must be pointed out that for seems to be
a remarkably productive preposition in English, as it is used here with very common
verbs, but its closest French equivalent, the goal preposition pour, is not used quite as
much.
Finally, we find two verbs which both use the preposition of. Traditionally it is said that of
is the equivalent of the French de; if so, we should be able to find the same semantic
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values at work with (6.1a) to approve of and (6.7a) to smell of as we did with (D11) partir de „to
leave‟, (D5) divorcer de „to divorce‟, etc. The core values of the preposition de in French
were separation, non-volitionality and passivity. It could be said that the second
argument in a sentence including the predicates approve or disapprove, must be nonagentive and non-volitional. As with the French (D6) douter de „to doubt‟, the process at
stake involves a judgement on the part of the human subject; that process passivises the
second argument, even when it is human. In (6.7a) to smell of the use of the preposition
of‟ is firstly motivated by the necessity of distinguishing two senses of the predicate smell:
one sense is active, as in I smell a fire where the subject acts the process referred to by the
predicate; the other sense is passive. In the sentence The garden smelt of honeysuckle the
subject the garden is non-agentive. Therefore, it is no surprise to see precisely the
preposition of‟ used with this passive sense.

In conclusion, this exercise, random and incomplete as the sample may be, still yields a
few lessons. It seems possible to find the same semantic values underpinning
prepositions in both French and English; it certainly appears to be the case with de and
of‟. It might even be the case to some extent with at and à. But already that example
suggested that a common core feature might be interpreted in different ways by
individual languages. Both prepositions might operate on related but not totally similar
values. And sometimes prepositions which are supposedly equivalent, might actually be
based on different values. For example, whereas for indicates prospectiveness, pour rather
indicates a goal. In addition, respective frequencies for those prepositions are certainly
not identical in both languages.
It is then rather difficult to assume, as the theories of the syntax-semantics interface did,
that all languages break down the cognitive perception of their environment into
identical categories. Here we have shown for instance that the semantic system

84

underlining English prepositions might function on a different interpretation of a given
set of values from the French system. There is nothing stopping us from speculating that
it might use a different set of values altogether. Therefore language-specificity in the
determination of argument structure does not appear only at the level of semantics-tosyntax linking. It is part and parcel of the semantic process itself.

6.3. A redefinition of transitivity

All the research about transitivity that we investigated in the course of this study,
focussed on the distinction between intransitivity and transitivity. After Hopper and
Thompson, we adopted the definition of transitivity as a „carry-over‟ or a „transfer‟
between two participants. We found that process justified in cognitive terms by the work
of Langacker for example. In that perspective, one could distinguish the transitive
predicates from the intransitive ones, by looking at the semantic value of their first
participant (most often the subject in English or in French). In the case of a transitive
process, the subject had a strong tendency to agentiveness; but with intransitive verbs,
the subject tended to be a simple theme. However, no research considers the question of
directness in transitivity: how is direct transitivity to be told apart from indirect
transitivity ? Unlike the distinction between intransitivity and transitivity, this one must
focus on the second argument of the predicate, the argument that appears immediately
after the verb. Whether that argument uses a preposition or not, is related to the issue of
its affectedness in the process.

According to Givón, IO is „not an affected patient‟ (1984, p.109). Givón implies that the
difference between a direct object and an indirect one, is that DO is affected by the
process expressed by the predicate, whereas IO is not. But what does he mean by
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„affected‟ ? If „affected‟ means „involved‟ in the transitive process, Givón is clearly wrong
since every participant that has been assigned a slot in a predicate‟s a-structure is part of
the process and must be affected by it. If „affected‟ somehow means „manipulated‟, then
he may be right. We saw in chapter 5 that the semantic values of humanity, animacy,
agentiveness and volitionality were all connected to the use of a preposition before the
second argument. They indicate that the object opposes all attempts at reification or
passivisation that could deprive it of meaningful participation in the process. Therefore,
the second argument may always be „affected‟ or involved, but it is not necessarily
inactive within it. Some types of participants, when construed as objects, have the
potential to exert some influence on the process. That potential is expressed by the
presence of a preposition that determines a status of indirect transitivity for the argument
structure of the predicate. The nature of the preposition used gives us information about
the type of influence which the object actually has. In French, the preposition à tends to
signal an object‟s strong opposition to the process initiated by the subject, by the means
of establishing a symbolic distance from the latter. But by using the preposition de, a
speaker assesses the object as being devoid of agentiveness and under the control of the
subject.

According to Hopper and Thompson, the more agency and the more volition its
participants display, the higher the chances of transitivity are for a process. But as with
any other approach to transitivity, Hopper and Thompson do not investigate the effects
of that claim for each individual participant. Again, it is crucial to emphasise the
distinction between first and second argument of the predicate. While agency and
volition of the first argument do point to its agentiveness, therefore to the likeliness of a
transferring (or transitive) process as exemplified by Langacker‟s energy chains, agency
and volition on the part of the second argument may run counter to the smooth
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implementation of that very process. It can have exactly the opposite effect and actually
detransitivise the predicate.
What agency, volition, etc. of the object actually highlight, is the ease with which a
transfer is carried out, or in other terms, the degree of transitivity of the process. The
more obstacles the object puts in the way of the subject‟s actions, the less transitive the
verb will be. We must conceive of transitivity not as mere manipulation of objects by
subjects, but as a struggle between participants bent on carrying out a process, and
participants more or less willing to be affected by it. Cooperation on the part of the
object translates into simple and direct transitivity; lack of cooperation, on the other
hand, is signalled by a prepositional object, and translates into indirect transitivity.
Therefore we are now able to add to Hopper and Thompson‟s initial approach to the
issue of transitivity. It is a continuum in which indirect transitivity finds its natural place
between total intransitivity and direct transitivity. Indirect transitivity is indeed transitivity
in as much as it involves a process of transfer between at least two participants; it then
stands on the right of intransitivity. But indirect transitivity also signals a difficult
process, somewhat hampered by the semantic values pertaining to the object; for that
reason, it stands on the left of pure transitivity.

Intransitivity

|

Transitivity
indirect

direct

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Appendix: Data verbs and examples
This appendix lists all the verbs we will use as a basis for our analysis. They are
designated by the letter D and a number, as determined by the alphabetical order of the
English predicates. Each verb sees its typical argument structures, as indicated in our
reference dictionaries, listed in the infinitive form for French and English.
Then examples for all the argument structures are displayed. The French examples are
translations of the concordancer-based English sentences quoted in our reference
English dictionary.

(D1)

to answer/répondre à
to answer something/répondre à quelque chose
to answer someone/répondre à quelqu’un

(D1a) She answered an advertisement for a full-time mother help
(D1b) Elle a répondu
à
une
She
answered
to
an
„She answered an advertisement

petite annonce
advertisement

pour une
aide maternelle
for
a
mother help
for a full-time mother help‟

à temps plein
full-time

(D1c) Answer your father !
(D1d) Réponds
à
ton
Answer
to
your
„Answer your father !‟

père !
father !
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(D2)

to ask/demander à
to ask someone/demander à quelqu’un
to ask something/demander quelque chose
to ask someone something-to ask something to someone/demander quelque chose à quelqu’un

(D2a) „How many languages can you speak ?‟ he asked the young girl
(D2b) “Combien de langues
parlez- vous ?”
How many languages
speak you(SG)
„ How many languages can you speak ?
demanda-t-il à
la
asked
he to
the
he asked the young girl‟

jeune
young

fille
girl

(D2c) He asked my name
(D2d) Il
demanda
He
asked
„He asked my name‟

mon
my

nom
name

(D2e) He started asking Diana a lot of things
(D2f) Il
commença à demander
beaucoup de choses à
Diana
He
started
to ask
a lot
of things to Diana
„He started asking Diana a lot of things‟
(D3)

to change/changer de
to change something/changer quelque chose
to change something/changer de quelque chose

(D3a) I changed the bulb
(D3b) J‟
ai
changé
I
PAST changed
„I changed the bulb‟

l‟
the

ampoule
bulb

d‟
of

emploi
job

(D3c) He changed job
(D3d) Il
a
changé
He
PAST changed
„He changed job‟
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(D4)

to decide/décider de
to decide something/décider de quelque chose

(D4a) Charlton‟s goal decided the match
(D4b) Le
but
de
Charlton a
The goal of
Charlton PAST
„Charlton‟s goal decided the match‟

(D5)

décidé
decided

du
match
of the match

to divorce/divorcer de
to divorce someone/divorcer de quelqu’un

(D5a) If she wants to divorce him, she has my sympathy
(D5b) Si elle veut
divorcer de lui, elle a
toute ma sympathie
If she wants to divorce from him, she has all
my sympathy
„If she wants to divorce him, she has my sympathy‟
(D6)

to doubt/douter de
to doubt something/douter de quelque chose
to doubt someone/douter de quelqu’un

(D6a) Some of our members doubt the value of demonstrations
(D6b) Certains de nos membres doutent de l‟ efficacité des
manifestations
Some
of our members doubt of the value
of the demonstrations
„Some of our members doubt the value of demonstrations‟
(D6c) Why should I doubt him ?
(D6d) Pourquoi
devrais- je
Why
should I
„Why should I doubt him ?‟
(D7)

douter
doubt

de
of

lui ?
him ?

de
of

vie
exceptionnel
living exceptional

to enjoy/jouir de1
to enjoy something/jouir de quelqu’un

(D7a) They enjoy exceptional standards of living
(D7b) Ils
jouissent d‟ un
niveau
They enjoy
of a
standard
„They enjoy exceptional standards of living‟

To enjoy is rather difficult to translate as it takes on a number of equivalents in French according to
context. Let us note however that jouir de is not as common a translation as aimer or apprécier, both direct
transitive verbs in French.
1
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(D8)

to escape/échapper à
to escape something/ échapper à quelque chose
to escape someone/échapper à quelqu’un

(D8a) I doubt that such tactics escape their notice
(D8b) Je doute que de telles tactiques échappent
I doubt that such
tactics
escape
„I doubt that such tactics escape their notice‟

à
to

leur
their

attention
notice

(D8c) And there is a major point that seems to have escaped Captain Imrie
(D8d) Et
il y a
un
détail d‟
importance
And there is a
point of
importance
„And there is a major point that seems to

qui
that

semble
seems to

avoir échappé
au
capitaine Imrie
have escaped
to the Captain Imrie
have escaped Captain Imrie‟
(D9)

to fax/faxer à
to fax something/faxer quelque chose
to fax someone/faxer à quelqu’un
to fax someone something/faxer quelque chose à quelqu’un
to fax something to someone/faxer quelque chose à quelqu’un

(D9a) She faxed the bad news
(D9b) Elle a
faxé la
She
PAST faxed the
„She faxed the bad news‟

mauvaise
bad

nouvelle
news

(D9c) She faxed her brother
(D9d) Elle a
faxé à
She
PAST faxed to
„She faxed her brother‟

son
her

frère
brother

(D9e) She faxed her brother the bad news
(D9f) Elle a
faxé la
mauvaise
She PAST faxed the
bad
„She faxed the bad news to her brother‟

nouvelle
news

à son frère
to her brother

nouvelle
news

à son frère
to her brother

(D9g) She faxed the bad news to her brother
(D9f) Elle a
faxé la
mauvaise
She PAST faxed the
bad
„She faxed the bad news to her brother‟
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(D10) to forgive/pardonner à
to forgive something/pardonner quelque chose
to forgive someone/pardonner à quelqu’un
to forgive someone something/pardonner quelque chose à quelqu’un
(D10a) They had forgiven his delayed arrival
(D10b) Ils
avaient pardonné
son
retard
They had
forgiven
his
delay
„They had forgiven his delayed arrival‟
(D10c) They had forgiven their host
(D10d) Ils
avaient pardonné
à
They had
forgiven
to
„They had forgiven their host‟

leur
their

hôte
host

(D10e) They had forgiven their host his delayed arrival
(D10f) Ils
avaient pardonné
à
leur
hôte
They had
forgiven
to
their host
„They had forgiven their host his delayed arrival‟

son
his

retard
delay

(D11) to leave/partir de1
to leave something/partir de quelque chose
(D11a) My train leaves Euston at 11.30
(D11b) Mon train part de
Euston
My
train leaves from Euston
„My train leaves Euston at 11.30‟

à
at

11 h 30
11.30

(D12) to obey/obéir à – to disobey/désobéir à
to obey something/obéir à quelque chose
– to disobey something/désobéir à quelque chose
to obey someone/obéir à quelqu’un
- to disobey someone/désobéir à quelqu’un
(D12a) The troops were reluctant to obey orders
(D12b) Les
troupes rechignaient
à
The troops were reluctant
to
„The troops were reluctant to obey orders‟

obéir aux
obey to the

ordres
orders

To leave actually translates in three different ways in French: I have obviously selected the translation that
yields an indirect transitive verb. We must note that partir de is strictly used for situations where the object
is a location, either real or symbolic. The other two translations are quitter and laisser, both direct transitive
verbs.
1
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(D12c) It never occurred to them that they could disobey their parents
(D12d) Il
ne
leur
It
NEG to them
„It never occurred to them

est
jamais venu à l‟esprit
PAST never occurred

qu‟
ils
pouvaient
désobéir
that
they could
disobey
that they could disobey their parents‟

à
to

leurs
their

parents
parents

(D13) to phone/téléphoner à
to phone someone/téléphoner à quelqu’un
(D13a) I went back to the hotel to phone Jenny
(D13b) Je
suis
retourné
à l‟
hôtel pour téléphoner à Jenny
I
PAST went back
to the hotel to
phone
to Jenny
„I went back to the hotel to phone Jenny‟
(D14) to press/appuyer sur
to press something/appuyer sur quelque chose
(D14a) The young man pressed a button
(D14b) Le
jeune homme
appuya sur
The young man
pressed on
„The young man pressed a button‟

un
a

bouton
button

(D15) to renounce/renoncer à
to renounce something/renoncer à quelque chose
(D15a) We have renounced the use of force to settle our dispute
(D15b) Nous avons renoncé
à
l‟
We
have renounced
to
the
„We have renounced the use of force
pour régler notre différend
to
settle our
dispute
to settle our dispute‟
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usage de
use
of

la
the

force
force

(D16) to resemble/ressembler à
to resemble something/ressembler à quelque chose
to resemble someone/ressembler à quelqu’un
(D16a) The situation resembles that of Europe in 1940
(D16b) La
situation
ressemble
à celle de l‟
Europe
The situation
resembles
to that of the Europe
„The situation resembles that of Europe in 1940‟

en 1940
in 1940

(D16c) Both you and your father resemble him very much physically
(D16d) Votre père et
vous lui
ressemblez
Your father and
you
to him resemble
„Both you and your father resemble him

tous les deux
both

beaucoup
physiquement.
a lot
physically
very much physically‟
(D17) to resist/résister à
to resist something/résister à quelque chose
to resist someone/résister à quelqu’un
(D17a) Our union resisted the introduction of automation
(D17b) Notre syndicat a
résisté à l‟ introduction de l‟ automatisation
Our union
PAST resisted to the introduction of the automation
„Our union resisted the introduction of automation‟
(D17c) They tried to resist the robbers
(D17d) Ils
ont
essayé de
résister
They PAST tried to
resist
„They tried to resist the robbers‟

aux
voleurs
to the robbers

(D18) to suit/convenir à
to suit someone/convenir à quelqu’un
(D18a) You should do what the doctor thinks will suit you and your baby best
(D18b)Vous devriez
faire comme
You should
do
as
„You should do what the doctor thinks
qu‟
il
conviendra
le mieux
that
it
will suit
the best
will suit you and your baby best‟
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le
the

docteur
doctor

pense
thinks

à vous et
à votre bébé
to you and to your baby

(D19) to telegraph/télégraphier à
to telegraph something/télégraphier quelque chose
to telegraph someone/télégraphier à quelqu’un
to telegraph someone something/télégraphier quelque chose à quelqu’un
to telegraph something to someone/télégraphier quelque chose à quelqu’un
(D19a) He had forgotten to telegraph condolences
(D19b) Il
avait oublié
de
télégraphier
He
had
forgotten
to
telegraph
„He had forgotten to telegraph condolences‟

ses
his

condoléances
condolences

à
to

la
the

ses
his

condoléances
condolences

(D19c) He had forgotten to telegraph the widow
(D19d) Il
avait oublié
de
télégraphier
He
had
forgotten
to
telegraph
„He had forgotten to telegraph the widow‟

veuve
widow

(D19e) He had forgotten to telegraph the widow condolences
(D19f) Il
avait oublié
de
télégraphier
He
had
forgotten
to
telegraph
„He had forgotten to telegraph the widow
à
la
veuve
to
the
widow
condolences‟
(D19g) He had forgotten to telegraph condolences to the widow
(D19h) Il
avait oublié
de
télégraphier
He
had
forgotten
to
telegraph
„He had forgotten to telegraph the widow
à
la
veuve
to
the
widow
condolences‟
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ses
his

condoléances
condolences

(D20) to value/tenir à1 2
to value something/tenir à quelque chose
(D20a) When they reach that age, they value their independence
(D20b) Lorsqu‟ ils
atteignent cet âge, ils
tiennent à leur indépendance
When they reach
that age, they value
to their independence
„When they reach that age, they value their independence‟

To value something (translated as évaluer quelque chose) is a verb of measure, with no psychological effect
attached: it behaves transitive directly in both languages:
1

(D20c)

The dealer valued the book at $200

(D20d) L’
antiquaire évalua le
The
dealer
valued
the
‘The dealer valued the book at $200’

livre
book

à
at

200 dollars
$200

Note that French allows the phrase tenir à quelqu’un whereas English does not have an equivalent *to value
someone.
2
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